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ARTICLES
FROM TRADEMARKS TO BRANDS
Deven R. Desai
Abstract
The business world has moved from using trademarks—simple
symbols identifying products—to brands—rich symbols that feed
business strategy. At the same time, networked and empowered
consumers are using brands, brand language, and branding strategies to
make decisions about what they purchase, express preferences about
how corporations conduct their business, and call for changes in
corporate practices. These changes are the future of commerce. But
trademark law has not kept pace with either.
This Article argues that because brands are governed by trademark
law, the full realization of brands as information resources is hindered.
Current trademark law is blinkered and confused, and consequently fails
to manage all the interests at stake in the modern business environment.
This failure flows from a core misunderstanding: trademark law has not
grasped that it is managing brands, not trademarks. To address this
shortcoming, this Article develops a new theory of trademarks: brand
theory. This theory explains riddles within current trademark doctrine
and provides the foundation for a new normative approach to
trademarks. It expands the current information-based understanding of
trademarks to embrace the possibility that trademarks can be true
information resources for all stakeholders in a brand—corporations,
consumers, and communities—rather than vessels for only one side’s
views. In short, a brand theory of trademarks offers the opportunity to
bring trademark law into the information age.
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INTRODUCTION
A Coke is a Coke and no amount of money can get you a better Coke
than the one the bum on the corner is drinking. All the Cokes are the
same and all the Cokes are good. Liz Taylor knows it, the president
knows it, the bum knows it and you know it.
—Andy Warhol1
Andy Warhol said that a “Coke is a Coke,” but Coke the brand is
much more than just a Coke. Warhol was referring to Coke as a
standardized product that is the same regardless of who buys it. That
perspective is a trademark way of thinking about Coke. But part of
1. Rob Walker, Cult Classic, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 11, 2009, at MM22 (quoting Andy
Warhol).
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Coke’s power comes from Coke the brand. Coke’s label with the words
“Coca-Cola” flowing across a red field in white cursive script or Coke’s
iconic glass bottle are aspects of Coke’s brand. Coke’s brand also has an
emotional, symbolic component, as the brand evokes a sense of being
all-American, “Classic,” and the perfect refreshing drink, whether it is
the Fourth of July or Christmas. A sip of Coke means imbibing an entire
culture.
Coke the brand is also much more than just Coke’s brand. When
Coke tried to deviate from its image and offered New Coke, a Coke
with a different flavor and corn syrup instead of cane sugar, the public
spoke up. Consumers wanted the “Real Thing.” They hoarded old
formula Coke, formed protest groups (with more than 100,000 members
in some cases), wrote songs about the old taste, and staged
demonstrations.2 As Coke’s official history admits, tests indicated
people wanted a different flavor but failed to reveal “the bond
consumers felt with their Coca-Cola—something they didn’t want
anyone, including The Coca-Cola Company, tampering with.”3 So much
so that Coke had to offer Coke Classic, which has now simply become
Coke again with the “Classic” designation dropped.
Coke’s brand has recently encountered a new problem related to
Coke from Mexico. In contrast to U.S. Coke, Mexican Coke is still
made with cane sugar. There is now a growing fanbase for Mexican
Coke. Some want Coke in the classic glass bottle; some believe the
flavor is better; some believe cane sugar is healthier.4 Consumers search
online for tips on how to find sources of Mexican Coke and even have a
Facebook page with more than 10,000 fans.5 Coke initially opposed the
importation.6 Yet now Coke has altered course, and one can purchase
this other Coke in box retail stores alongside U.S. Coke, which Coke
offers in a resurrected Coke glass bottle, aluminum can, or plastic
bottle.7
Brands and their relationship to the law have been woefully
undertheorized. Brands are regulated by trademark law, which fails to
grasp that trademarks are merely a subset of brands and that it manages
brands at all. Instead, trademark law champions corporations as the sole
2. Coke Lore: The Real Story of New Coke, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY,
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/heritage/cokelore_newcoke.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2012).
3. Id. (emphasis added).
4. See Walker, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. See Bruce Kennedy, Mexican Coca-Cola Is Finding Sweet Success in the U.S., DAILY
FIN. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/company-news/mexican-coca-cola-isfinding-sweet-success-in-the-u-s/19639897.
7. Id.
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custodians of trademark meaning. As Professor Robert G. Bone
explains, trademark law’s “core mission, as it is understood today, is to
facilitate the transmission of accurate information to the market.”8
Trademark law thus clings to the model of the firm as the one with the
exclusive power to develop the brand and to control its meaning.9
In addition, trademark law formally relies on the singular idea that
trademarks are only about economic efficiency.10 From this perspective,
trademarks enhance the economic efficiency of the marketplace by
“lessen[ing] consumer search costs by making products and producers
easier to identify in the marketplace,” and “encourag[ing] producers to
invest in quality by ensuring that they, and not their competitors, reap
the reputation-related rewards of that investment.”11 In this view, the
mark becomes a sign of “consistent source and quality.”12
8. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2006) (emphasis added).
9. In a seminal trademark law article, Professor Ralph Brown argued that protection for
trade symbols was only proper if such protection served the informational function of trade
symbols, not any extra persuasive functions. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1183–84 (1948). Although
Brown sought to limit trademark protection, this Article argues that by focusing solely on the
corporate side of information transmission, Brown’s approach failed to account for other
important sources of information to the marketplace; thus, and perhaps of necessity, it was
doomed to failure. Cf. Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the
Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1734 (1999) (arguing against providing brand producers
all brand value because of brand value is collectively created).
10. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987).
11. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(2004); accord Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995)
(“[T]rademark law . . . ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing
decisions,’ for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with
this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked
(or disliked) in the past.” (alteration in original) (quoting 1 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2], at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994))).
12. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 790 (1997); cf. Mark A. Lemley & Mark
McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010). Professors Mark Lemley
and Mark McKenna further explained this proposition:
When it works well, trademark law facilitates the workings of modern markets
by permitting producers to accurately communicate information about the
quality of their products to buyers, thereby encouraging them to invest in
making quality products, particularly in circumstances in which that quality
wouldn’t otherwise be apparent. If competitors can falsely mimic that
information, they will confuse consumers, who won’t know whether they are in
fact getting a high quality product. Indeed, some consumers will be stuck with
lemons.
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This understanding of the information transmission function
performed by brands such as Coca-Cola is far too limited. Its premise is
that the mark holder’s information is the best or only information a
consumer may desire in assessing a purchase. Yet modern technology
makes this model obsolete. As the Coke example reveals, consumers do
not express their market preferences through purchasing decisions
alone; they also create and share information that contributes
significantly to the image and meaning of the brand.13 Similar examples
of consumers engaging with and shaping brands are found across a wide
range of commercial industries—from automotive to beverage, music,
clothing, cosmetic, and food, among others.14
While trademark law sees trademarks and brands as synonymous,15
brand scholarship and practice recognize that they are not. 16 Brands
have many functions. One function maps well to trademark law: the
corporate provision of information regarding a product to help a
consumer make a purchase. Trademark law, however, recognizes only
that function, and in far too limited a way. The corporate dimension of
branding creates a strategic asset that allows a corporation to forge not
only a product symbol, but also a connection with consumers so that
consumers look beyond price when they make a purchasing decision.17
It also enables corporations to sell multiple branded products and
ancillary merchandise and to turn the brand into a product in its own
right.18
Id.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64 (“We cannot find in the basic objectives of
trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark, where
that color has attained ‘secondary meaning’ and therefore identifies and distinguishes a
particular brand (and thus indicates its ‘source’). In principle, trademark law, by preventing
others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions.’” (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 2.01[2], at 23)); see
also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental purpose of a
trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier
of the particular source of particular goods. The consumer who knows at a glance whose brand
he is being asked to buy knows whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints and whose
product to buy in the future if the brand pleases. This in turn gives producers an incentive to
maintain high and uniform quality, since otherwise the investment in their trademark may be
lost as customers turn away in disappointment from the brand. A successful brand, however,
creates an incentive in unsuccessful competitors to pass off their inferior brand as the successful
brand by adopting a confusingly similar trademark, in effect appropriating the goodwill created
by the producer of the successful brand. The traditional and still central concern of trademark
law is to provide remedies against this practice.”).
16. See infra Parts I.A–B.
17. See infra Part I.A.1.
18. See infra Part I.A.2.
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The noncorporate dimension of branding involves consumers and
communities as stakeholders in brands.19 Consumers often buy branded
goods not for their quality but as badges of loyalty, ways to express
identity, and items to alter and interpret for self-expression.20 Some
consumers form brand communities which either evangelize or police
brand meaning and corporate practices.21 From the perspective of
trademark law, this behavior presents a problem; from the perspective
of brand scholarship, it is both ordinary and expected.
This Article sets forth a new theory of trademarks—one that focuses
on brands, their functions, and their democratic nature.22 This account
avoids the incoherence and problems that currently plague trademark
law and scholarship and offers a framework to guide future discussions
on the purpose, function, and scope of trademark law.
A brand theory of trademark law explains the current (and
outmoded) state of this area of law and points the way towards the
future. The theory offers the most coherent account as to what
interests—producer or consumer—were at stake in past shifts and
expansions in trademark protection, and how they were justified.
Prospectively, when a claim for new protection is made, the theory
provides tools and vocabulary to recognize precisely what interest is at
issue and what interests trademark law ought to vindicate, rather than
relying on broad notions about the relationship between producers and
consumers and market welfare. As a normative matter, brand theory
offers a true information-based view of trademarks and a system in
which both mark holders and consumers are free to share information
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part I.B.1.
21. See infra Part I.B.2.
22. Thus far, although some trademark scholarship has mentioned brands, no one has
pointed out that trademark law should focus on brands and all their dimensions rather than
trademarks. To be clear, this Article owes much to work by Rochelle Dreyfus, Jessica Litman,
and others who have explained the drive to propertize trademarks, documented the problems
from such a shift, described some brand behaviors, and argued for greater acknowledgement of
the role consumers play in constructing trademarks’ meanings. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 397 passim (1990) (explaining the way in which consumers use trademarks as valuable
parts of expression and how trademark law hinders such uses); Litman, supra note 9, passim
(tracking changes in advertising practices and trademark law from competition-enhancing
actions and efforts to persuade consumers to buy products to the provision of complete
corporate control over trade symbols). These works do not, however, connect brand scholarship
and practice to the overall structure of trademark law. Thus, this Article follows these
foundational works as they sought to have trademark law match practice and expand its view to
understand, accommodate, and protect noncommercial interests. See Dreyfuss, supra, at 398–99.
In their spirit, this Article hopes to expand the understanding of how brands function and to
explain why law has come to embrace more than “nondeceptive, informative, and sourcedesignating functions of trade symbols.” Litman, supra note 9, at 1735.
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about brands without the hindrances the current system imposes. In both
situations, a brand theory of trademark creates room to be clearer about
what we are protecting, why we are protecting it, and what we give up
in protecting one interest over another.
Part I explains what brands are and how they are different from
trademarks. Drawing on sociological and marketing scholarship, it
explains how trademark law has mistakenly equated trademarks with
brands despite brands being far more complex than trademarks. It then
offers a taxonomy for understanding the corporate and noncorporate
dimensions of brands. Part I concludes by showing how brands have
become the place where the two dimensions complement each other and
open the door to the co-creation of value by corporate and noncorporate
stakeholders.
Part II applies brand theory to core aspects of and specific puzzles
within trademark doctrine. The general criticism that trademark law has
expanded well beyond its traditional law and economics foundations
may be accurate but tells us little. The corporate dimension of brand
theory, however, explains these issues and shows that trademark law
has evolved along the corporate dimension of brands while leaving
important consumer interests behind.
Part III puts the theory further to the test and offers a brand theory
critique of trademark law. This approach shows that trademark law
misunderstands and by design fails to accommodate the noncorporate
dimension of brands. As but one example, Part III shows that a brand
approach to the likelihood of confusion test would improve this core
aspect of trademark law. In addition, it offers a guiding normative
claim: trademark law should adopt a more open perspective of brands,
such as the perspective used by marketing and business disciplines.
Marketing and business disciplines look to a more open, democratic
understanding of brands precisely because such an approach enhances
the value of brands and fits with the way brands operate in the
marketplace. Trademark law ought embrace just such a perspective.
Furthermore, an open approach creates room for individuals and
communities to use brands as a locus of personal expression, political
debate, and market discussion. This approach adheres to an informationbased understanding of trademarks and embraces the possibility that
they can be true information resources for all sides of the information
marketplace rather than vessels for only one side’s views.
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I. BRANDS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Trademarks and brands are not the same.23 Using marks for the
“utilitarian provision of information regarding origin and quality in
order to reduce risk and uncertainty”24 is only a part of what brands
encompass.25 Brands have “more complex . . . characteristics . . . which
are related to image building and include status/power, inherent value
and finally, the development of brand personality.”26 As one study puts
it, marks that only convey information or offer only one part of image
building are proto-brands.27 It is only around the late nineteenth century
that one sees the birth of modern brands: the use of a private mark to
provide information regarding source and quality and simultaneously to
convey image components regarding power, value, and personality.28
Put simply, brands have an array of functions depending on who is
using the brand and in what context.29 A company uses brands to
23. Historical work identifies a range of practices for marking goods, including branding,
as examples of or precursors to the way in which modern trademark functions. See FRANK I.
SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 20–21
(1925) (distinguishing between trademarks and marks designating ownership, and noting the
importance of these “proprietary marks” in the development of modern trademark law); Sidney
A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 266–72
(1975) (noting that the history of trademarks dates back to the branding of cattle and other
animals); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 310–16 (1979) (noting that “the earliest use of marks on
goods dates to antiquity, and were primarily used as an indication of personal ownership”);
Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks—Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 551–52
(1969) (discussing the use of marks as a method for distinguishing a maker’s product from
others); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L. REV.
29, 29–30 (1910) (dating the usage of trademarks back to “the very earliest times,” where marks
were used for identification purposes). In early eras, brands were burned or carved marks
indicating ownership, slave, or criminal status. See Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands,
Competition, and the Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1425, 1432 (“Although many different ancient
and medieval civilizations—from the Indus river valley to China to several Mediterranean
cultures to Nigeria to the Arab Empire to medieval England—used brands and a variety of other
commercial symbols to indicate ownership and facilitate commerce[,] none of those uses
corresponds to modern brands.”); Diamond, supra, at 266–67, 273, 283–85.
24. Karl Moore & Susan Reid, The Birth of the Brand: 4,000 Years of Branding History 5,
25 (MPRA, Working Paper No. 10169, 2008), available at http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/10169/ (examining branding practices from 2250 BCE to 300 BCE).
25. See, e.g., Susan Fournier, Consumers and Their Brands: Developing Relationship
Theory in Consumer Research, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 343, 344 (1998) (challenging the way in
which brand theory often reduces to utilitarian views).
26. Moore & Reid, supra note 24, at 25.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. at 24, 26.
29. Some may want or prefer a definition of a brand. Although understandable, this
Article argues that because a brand has several, simultaneous functions depending on contexts
and operates within information and network rules, a taxonomy of brands is more useful than a
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provide product information to consumers, but it also uses brands to
enhance the overall corporate image as the company pursues a full
range of business goals. Consumers may, of course, use brands to find
products. But consumers may simultaneously use brands as expressions
of individuality and identity as they take a brand and alter it to match
what they see as the meaning of the brand and how that meaning relates
to their self-image or message. Communities may also engage with a
brand as a symbol about which they wish to comment and share both
positive and negative information.
Some simple examples illustrate how brands have utilitarian and
non-utilitarian dimensions. Consider the brands McDonald’s, Nike,
Apple, and Gucci. At one level, they all help consumers sort products.
One can buy a Big Mac in New York, Los Angeles, or anywhere in the
United States, and it will be the same. Nike, Apple, and Gucci offer a
similar, but not quite the same, proposition. One can buy a shoe,
electronic device, or item of clothing, but often none of them will be
exactly the same as a previously purchased shoe, device, or outfit. A
line may have been altered or discontinued. Instead of relying on the
item to remain the same, the consumer relies on the symbol for
assurance that the product will live up to her expectations.
The Nike shoe will essentially be the same as the shoe one bought
previously; it will provide support, decay after a certain number of uses,
and so on. Other Nike products will likely, but not definitely, be wellsuited for the various athletic activities at which they are aimed. Apple
devices will be elegant, have an easy interface, start up and shut down
quickly, and be stable. Gucci apparel will have a certain attention to
detail, use high-end fabric, and fit within Gucci style, which Gucci will
define over time. In these cases, brands relate to the company as a
source for a host of goods with somewhat consistent qualities.
If a competitor used those same marks on goods, the consumer
might be quite upset. She can no longer rely on the mark to indicate
source and quality. As consumers are forced to engage in new searches,
their sense of trust in the mark diminishes. The law prevents such acts
in the name of protecting the consumer from increased search costs and
protecting the producer’s goodwill. That is, the law claims to protect the
producer’s investment in making and offering a product that consumers

reductive definition. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 919, 983 n.237 (“[S]ocial networks analysis is often context-dependent in ways that
defy easy characterization or simplistic modeling. The ‘rules’ of social network theory (for
example, the strength of weak ties, the tendency for social networks to be scale-free, the
tendency of information of information to degrade as it passes through a social network)
necessarily operate at a medium to high level of generality.”).
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wish to purchase from that producer because the producer is offering a
product with known quality.
Yet some authorized merchandise, such as keychains, are low-end
products and often are not held to the same standard as the main
products with, for example, the Apple logo on them. Companies
sometimes offer lower-end goods as a way to expand their market,
foster good feelings toward the company’s core products, or maintain a
relationship with consumers who want to engage with the brand but not
the company’s high-cost products.30
Even when a company does not authorize the production of such
merchandise, a consumer may buy unauthorized, branded goods
knowing full well that the company does not sanction them.31 People
buy clothes, flags, beer cozies, mobile phone shells, and almost any
merchandise one can imagine with a favorite sports team logo, comic
book character, or other cultural symbol regardless of whether the team
or entertainment company authorized the item’s manufacture. In these
situations, people are simply not confused.
Many companies encourage consumers to see a brand as having a
personality and to accept the idea that owning a branded good connects
the consumer to the brand in some deep, personal way.32 Buying
30. Cf. Litman, supra note 9, at 1726–27 (explaining that marketing is a value on its own
and that some find a box of cereal with Batman on it different than one without).
31. See, e.g., Ingrida Karins Berzins, Comment, The Emerging Circuit Split over
Secondary Meaning in Trade Dress Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (2004) (“Big-city
sidewalk vendors have long hawked ‘Rolex’ watches and ‘Donna Karan’ t-shirts. In an upscale
twist on the theme, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that ‘purse parties,’ in which
hostesses sell knockoff designer goods to their friends, are a hot new trend, albeit with the
potential downside of jail time.”); cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 22, at 407 (explaining the idea of
surplus value and issues regarding whether the mark holder or another manufacturer should get
that value). For a discussion of how intellectual property law in general may be seen as a
reaction to “increasingly powerful copying technologies [that] threaten quickly to dilute the
rarity and thus the distinctiveness of otherwise distinctive goods,” see Barton Beebe, Intellectual
Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 815 (2010).
32. See WILLIAM J. MCEWEN, MARRIED TO THE BRAND: WHY CONSUMERS BOND WITH
SOME BRANDS FOR LIFE 32–33 (2005). William J. McEwen lists five ways a brand can have
personal meaning: as a sign of prestige (for example, the status of wearing a Rolex watch),
personal quality (for example, youth for Pepsi or competitive excellence in Nike), membership
(for example, the club-like aspect of owning a Harley-Davidson motorcycle), memory triggers
(for example, associating a food brand with family tradition), and self-completion (for example,
brands that consumers see as signs of self-completion, such as Marlboro as a sign of being a
rugged man or L’Oreal as a sign of being worth spending extra for oneself). See id. at 36–38;
see also MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN & NEIL FISKE, TRADING UP: WHY CONSUMERS WANT NEW
LUXURY GOODS—AND HOW COMPANIES CREATE THEM 34–35, 41, 48 (2005) (discussing the
emotional outcomes of branding as well as the feeling of individualization). For an excellent
account of how Nike built its brand, see generally DONALD KATZ, JUST DO IT: THE NIKE SPIRIT
IN THE CORPORATE WORLD (1994).
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branded goods, authorized or not, is one way in which consumers build
that connection. Given the mystique behind McDonald’s, Apple, Nike,
Gucci, and other powerful brands, the consumer is buying the brand
itself.33
Taken further, a consumer may use a brand to express herself. The
brand is a symbol not for the producer, but for the consumer; she either
embraces the brand’s offered image as an outward sign of personality or
criticizes the brand image.34 In some cases, a community may form
around a brand. The group will use the brand as the center of activity
that celebrates or passes judgment on the brand, depending on how the
group perceives the company’s ability to remain true to either the
company’s claimed vision of the brand or the group’s understanding of
the true meaning of the brand.35
Brand scholarship is not, however, directly aimed at the law. For
that literature to be useful for legal discussions, a synthesis is required.
The remainder of Part I develops a taxonomy of brand functions
33. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 827, 849 (2004) (“Consumers often value trademarks for their own sake, and the incessant
promotion of brands blurs the dividing line between the trademark and the goods themselves.”).
34. Id.; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 22, at 413–14 (noting language’s malleability and
the way in which meaning is shaped by interactions specific to speakers’ and listeners’ actions
to open a path to a “new level of understanding”).
35. See, e.g., MCEWEN, supra note 32, at 37, 89–90:
As a regional brewer, Coors had an intensely loyal following bonded to and
very proud of the brand because of its unique, Colorado- and RockyMountains-only availability and image. However, as Coors expanded to
maximize its volume potential, it also lost a good deal of the Colorado panache
that had cemented its original customers to what they saw as a unique, personal
brand experience that was not readily available to or intended for all.
Whether such communities form around brands with less obvious community dimensions, such
as Post-it or Bic pens, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Post-it has a Facebook page and seems
to desire that some level of brand community emerge, which is to be expected from a brand
approach to its trademark. See Post-It, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/postit (last visited
Mar. 8, 2012). I thank Barton Beebe for raising this point. In addition, the consumer and
community aspects of branding might be understood as a type of recoding problem. See Justin
Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV.
923, 926–27 (1999) (noting the tensions between users of intellectual property who wish to use
and “recode” a given intellectual property and the desire for other users to have the intellectual
property remain stable). In trademark law, the problem can be that one group wishes to maintain
the stability of a mark’s meaning as the group sees it, but that vision may conflict with the
stability we may want for the mark as it operates in the marketplace. Id. at 1006–07. The general
problem of recoding and reinterpreting a mark while maintaining a viable trademark system is a
core question in trademark law. A fuller explanation of the way that understanding brands as
information devices can allow for both recoding and stability for the trademark system is
beyond the scope of this Article but is addressed in part in my forthcoming scholarship. See
Deven R. Desai, An Information Approach to Trademarks, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
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designed for trademark law. Brand scholarship can be split into two
major dimensions. One, the corporate dimension, sees the brand as
owned and controlled by the corporation and shaped by the marketer.
The other, the noncorporate dimension, accepts that brands are social
constructs driven by individuals at a personal level and communities at
a social level. The next two sections identify the four major types of
modern brands and explore what brand scholarship has to say about
their roles. Although the corporate and noncorporate dimensions serve
useful descriptive, organizational, and analytical functions, they do not
connect to each other. To address this gap, this Part concludes by
examining recent business, marketing, and brand scholarship regarding
the way in which companies and consumers co-create value. It argues
that a new perspective of brands, a networked one, is emerging and
bridges the apparent divide between corporate and noncorporate views
of brands.
A. The Corporate Side of Brands
This Section explains how different views of the corporate aspects
of a brand have evolved in brand scholarship. A brand is first created by
a firm, often a corporation. Yet the corporation needs to connect to
something. Thus, a brand begins when it is connected to a product or
service—a product brand. Once that connection is made, the brand may
take on additional significance for the corporation. The brand may then
become an umbrella for all corporate offerings—a corporate brand.
Together, the product and corporate brands can be understood as falling
within the corporate side of brands.
1. Product Brands
Marking a single product for commerce is the simplest form of
branding.36 A manufacturer marks a product with a symbol that
indicates something to the world. Although this idea seems almost

36. For simplicity, this Article, like trademark law, draws little distinction between
trademarks and service marks. See, e.g., Paul M. Schoenhard, Why Marks Have Power Beyond
the Rights Conferred: The Conflation of Trademarks and Service Marks, 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 970, 972 (2005) (“By statute, the definitions of ‘service mark’ and
‘trademark’ differ only in the substitution of the term ‘services’ for the term ‘goods.’”).
Although service trademarks apply to goods and service marks “identify and distinguish the
source and quality of an intangible service,” for the purposes of this stage of the Article, the
important point is that one understand the idea of a company offering a single good or service. 3
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:81 (4th
ed. 2011).
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commonplace today, the practice only began in the 1800s.37 One of the
first examples of product branding occurred when Harley Procter
renamed his White Soap, Ivory Soap.38 By changing his formerly
generic name for a generic product, Procter created a unique product. In
general, “[b]y simply labeling products in grocery, dry goods, and
department stores with descriptive or colorful names, manufacturers
soon found that sales of the products increased significantly.”39 This
practice continued across almost all industries and created important
changes in the way commerce was conducted.40 Both brand and
trademark theory explain product branding as playing an important role;
product branding for the producer and the consumer. Nonetheless, both
assume that the producers are active creators of the brand, whereas
consumers are passive recipients.41
Brand management theory began with an economic approach that
mirrors the law’s approach to trademarks. The theory built on
“neoclassical economics and classical marketing theory” to understand
how a company’s marketing mix—the “4 Ps” of product, place, price,
and promotion—drove consumer behavior.42 This model sees the brand
as fully controlled and owned by the company and sees consumers as
those who take in and process information as they decide whether to
purchase a good or service.43 Brand holders push information regarding
an offering’s price and quality to consumers, and holders must find
ways to reduce search costs lest consumers purchase a product based on
inaccurate information.44 The brand becomes the device that allows a
manufacturer to exploit the “4 Ps.” Companies use advertising to inform
consumers about the target product and to encourage them to purchase
it,45 and when consumers are ready to buy, they encounter the target
product at the right price.
37. See MARCEL DANESI, BRANDS 13 (2006); Paul Duguid, Developing the Brand: The
Case of Alcohol, 1800–1880, 4 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 405 (2003) (examining brand practices
from early in the nineteenth century).
38. DANESI, supra note 37, at 13.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 13–14.
41. See Hope Jensen Schau et al., How Brand Community Practices Create Value, 73 J.
MARKETING 30, 30 (2009) (“Modern marketing logic, as derived from economics, advanced a
view of the firm and the customer as separate and discrete; the customer is exogenous to the
firm and is the passive recipient of the firm’s active value creation efforts . . . .”).
42. TILDE HEDING ET AL., BRAND MANAGEMENT: RESEARCH, THEORY AND PRACTICE 30
(2009) (citing Neil Borden’s work on the marketing mix and E. Jerome McCarthy’s
development of the “4 Ps” framework as key ideas behind brand management’s adoption of the
economic approach to branding).
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id. at 32–33; accord Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 269–70.
45. CELIA LURY, BRANDS: THE LOGOS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 23–24 (2004).
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Yet modern brand scholarship acknowledges a flaw in the economic
approach and criticizes the approach for being focused on short-term,
isolated transactions rather than establishing a long-term connection
with the consumer.46 In other words, if a brand only conveys market
information, the company is offering a new exchange each time a
consumer chooses to buy goods. A pure view of the brand as an
information resource for the consumer does not necessarily lead to
repeat purchases; it merely allows for faster information processing. In
addition, the view must assume that the consumer is a fully rational
maximizer who does not buy goods for “hedonic” purposes, such as
“emotional and irrational wants and desires.”47
Product branding touches on an important, yet small, part of what a
brand does. Some products, such as a bar of soap or a bottle of soda,
remain relatively stable. Many products, however, change quickly. In
addition, companies usually offer more than one product and may
discontinue product lines. This reality points to the next category of
brands: the corporate brand.
2. Corporate Brands
Once companies saw the advantages of branding, they quickly
began to brand the company itself. For example, the Parker Company
sold a range of fountain pens that were all “Parker pens.”48 Many of
today’s most powerful companies, such as Coca-Cola, Kodak, Heinz,
Gillette, Kraft, Johnson & Johnson, Ford, Tiffany, and Wrigley’s, as
well as more than fifty other major brands, started around 1900.49 These
companies were not selling just one product. They leveraged their
existing product position and offered new products to consumers.50
The shift is subtle, but central, to understanding brands. The
company, not a specific product, is the brand.51 Direct competition was
no longer the issue. Instead, companies with established brand names in
one sector of the economy sought to prevent companies in other sectors
from marking unrelated products with the established brand name.52
46. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 34.
47. Id. at 33; accord LURY, supra note 45, at 5–6.
48. DANESI, supra note 37, at 13.
49. See RONALD HAMBLETON, THE BRANDING OF AMERICA 61, 64–65, 90, 172–74, 182–83,
209–11 (1987); LURY, supra note 45, at 101.
50. See HAMBLETON, supra note 49, at 91–93, 172, 183, 210–11.
51. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 51; LURY, supra note 45, at 32.
52. See Bone, supra note 8, at 595–96 (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with
the problem); accord Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 731, 759–60 (2003) (examining how the court in Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Products, Inc.,
264 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932), quoted and incorporated Schechter’s ideas and opened the
door to dilution rationales in confusion cases).
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In this model, the corporate brand sits on top of the product brand.
Insofar as one claims that the corporate brand reduces search costs, it
does so only in a thin way. One relies on the brand to indicate that a
new product will be high quality, even if that product is something the
company has not made before. Or at the extreme, one may rely on the
brand when the company is entering a market in which the company has
never been before.53
Current brand scholarship takes three different approaches to
corporate branding. In each, the corporation drives the process of
creating the brand and using information to manage the brand. These
views of corporate branding begin to acknowledge that consumers are a
key part of the branding process; but at their core, they still relegate
consumers to the status of secondary actors who are inert or, at best,
merely process information fed to them.
The identity approach to corporate branding seeks to control the
way consumers experience the company at every level through “the
creation of a unified, visual and behavioral identity.”54 The corporation
seeks to align internal factors and external factors to offer the full brand
identity to all stakeholders: top management, employees, consumers,
and the media.55 Management continually offers its piece of the brand
and then incorporates feedback information to fine-tune the alignment
between internal and external factors that make up brand identity.56 For

53. Cf. Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 63, 117 (2009) (arguing that producer interests such as market entry may be what
trademark addresses rather than consumer interests).
54. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 49; cf. LURY, supra note 45, at 27 (describing the
way in which Levi’s, Persil, Mars, Smirnoff, and Versace maintained a consistent brand image,
which allowed them to extend the brand into new product offerings).
55. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 56–59. For example, according to Professor Celia
Lury, brands allowed companies to move beyond the “4 Ps” of product, price, place, promotion,
which a competitor could duplicate, to a fifth P, personality of a company, which competitors
could not copy. LURY, supra note 45, at 33–34. Although Lury calls this shift “personality,” it
maps to the corporate identity view. Lury defines her version of personality as being built and
reflected by the internal connection between the brand and employees who become “the soul” of
the brand. Id.; cf. DANESI, supra note 37, at 33 (explaining brands as personalities with
identities).
56. See Mary Jo Hatch & Majken Schultz, Relations Between Organizational Culture,
Identity and Image, 31 EUR. J. MARKETING 356, 359, 361 (1997) (describing the interaction
between internal and external information about corporate identity as managers “orchestrate
deliberate attempts to influence public impression”); see also Curtis P. Haugtvedt et al.,
Cognitive Strength of Established Brands: Memory, Attitudinal, and Structural Approaches, in
BRAND EQUITY & ADVERTISING: ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 247–48
(David A. Aaker & Alexander L. Biel eds., 1993) (discussing the need for the creation of “brand
memories”); accord HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 70; cf. DOUGLAS B. HOLT, HOW BRANDS
BECOME ICONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF CULTURAL BRANDING 15–16, 215 (2004) (arguing that brand
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example, by developing and refining product design, companies can
overcome “the lack of obvious differences between products.”57 But this
strategy is part of the larger strategic goal, one that sees management as
gathering information from stakeholders while it controls all the ways in
which the brand is communicated.58
A related corporate branding approach, the (somewhat ironically
named) consumer-based approach, focuses on how a brand exists from
the individual consumer’s view as a cognitive construct and then asks
how management can shape that perception.59 The consumer-based
approach presents a paradox. On one hand, the approach views the
consumer as the owner of the brand.60 On the other hand, because the
approach draws on cognitive psychology and the idea that the
information put into a system will generate specific outputs, it seeks to
map how a consumer understands the brand with the belief that offering
“exactly the right brand elements” will generate a desired response.61
These two views intersect and require that management begin by
gathering data from and about consumers to understand the consumer
perspective accurately. Management then generates brand
communication based on that understanding. The brand communication
seeks to ensure that consumers know the brand; thus, management must
choose the correct brand elements to ensure that consumers are aware of
the brand.62 This approach is premised on a concept called brand
awareness: the idea that consumers will remember a brand and purchase
a product for reasons beyond the functional aspects of a product and
even possibly pay a higher price for a good regardless of quality.63
identity is part of a general “mind share” approach to branding where a company constructs a
timeless brand and then tries to capture part of a consumer’s mind with that image).
57. LIZ MOOR, THE RISE OF BRANDS 27–28 (2007); see also DANESI, supra note 37, at 60–
67 (detailing the importance of product and package design through the examples of the
automobile, perfume, and tobacco industries).
58. See LURY, supra note 45, at 20–23; MOOR, supra note 57, at 30–33.
59. See Kevin Lane Keller, Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Customer-Based
Brand Equity, 57 J. MARKETING 1, 2 (1993).
60. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 85.
61. Id. at 86; see also Keller, supra note 59, at 9–12 (describing possible strategic actions
to increase brand equity under the consumer-based theory of brand management).
62. LURY, supra note 45, at 79 (explaining brand awareness, the amount of consumers
that know that a brand exists, as a key component to brand equity as defined by Keller); accord
HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 102–03 (“It is all about making the brand known to consumers,
making consumers pay attention to the brand by choosing the right brand elements.”).
63. Keller, supra note 59, at 8–9 (“Fundamentally, high levels of brand awareness and a
positive brand image should increase the probability of brand choice, as well as produce greater
consumer (and retailer) loyalty and decrease vulnerability to competitive marketing actions.
Thus, the view of brand loyalty adopted here is that it occurs when favorable beliefs and
attitudes for the brand are manifested in repeat buying behavior. Some of these beliefs may
reflect the objective reality of the product, in which case no underlying customer-based brand
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To achieve brand awareness, management must make sure that
consumers pay attention to the brand.64 By analyzing consumer data,
management can assess which aspects of a brand have positive, neutral,
and negative effects and craft a strategy for future brand activity.
Because consumers face a barrage of similar information about
competing brands, management seeks to craft a consistent and often
repeated brand message that resonates with consumers and carves out
lasting mental associations; in that sense brand awareness is high.65
A third major approach to brand theory, the personality approach,
rounds out corporate branding. The personality approach focuses on the
ways in which consumers ascribe personalities to brands66 and holds
that “consumers’ need for identity and expression of self is a key driver
of the consumption of a brand.”67 With this understanding, companies
create “system[s] that . . . link brand names to broader values and
meanings . . . .”68
In this personality-driven system, products have “essences” that
meet consumers’ psychological needs and lifestyle goals.69 Consumers
use brands to define themselves on a personal level so that they may
have an idea about who they are while aspiring to a different way of
being.70 In addition, a given consumer may use a brand or brands to
equity may be present, but in other cases they may reflect favorable, strong, and unique
associations that go beyond the objective reality of the product.”); accord HEDING ET AL., supra
note 42, at 104 (noting that under the consumer-based approach, consumers may “be willing to
pay a premium price and accept lower-quality goods for the same brand if it is a brand with high
awareness”).
64. Curtis Haugtvedt et al., supra note 56, at 247–48 (raising suggestions for achieving
brand awareness); H. Shanker Krishnan & Dipankar Chakravarti, Varieties of Brand Memory
Induced by Advertising: Determinants, Measures, and Relationships, in BRAND EQUITY AND
ADVERTISING: ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 213, 215–16 (David A. Aaker
& Alexander L. Biel eds., 1993) (detailing the way in which ads may grab the consumer’s
attention); accord HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 104 (detailing the importance of repeat
exposure to commercial messaging). But see Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds:
Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 511 (2008) (questioning the
validity of the cognitive science claims regarding how brands are stored in a consumer’s mind).
65. HOLT, supra note 56, at 15–16.
66. One of the foundational articles in this field is Professor Jennifer Aaker’s Dimensions
of Brand Personality, 34 J. MARKETING RES. 347, 347 (1997), which examines the general idea
that consumers imbue brands with human personalities and offers a systematic way to assess
what those personalities are for a given brand.
67. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 117.
68. MOOR, supra note 57, at 23.
69. See LURY, supra note 45, at 24–25; cf. DANESI, supra note 37, at 8, 16 (describing
how advertising aims to persuade a consumer that a product will fulfill “emotional, social, and
other kinds of human needs”).
70. Karl Moore and Susan Reid describe the growth of the brand as a company creating a
personality for a brand which a consumer then incorporates into how that consumer “express[es]
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signal where he may fit into the social world.71 When a brand matches
either of these aspects of the consumer’s view of himself, the resulting
congruence drives the consumer to purchase items bearing the brand.72
Accordingly, management seeks to understand how consumers use
brands in fashioning their identities and to offer brands with
characteristics that match consumers’ needs.73
All three approaches to branding—identity, consumer, and
personality—view the company brand, not the product brand, as the
central matter.74 As Richard Branson—master of branding and CEO of
Virgin—has put it, companies “build brands not around products but
around reputation.”75 The identity approach seeks to control and shape
his or her own self, an ideal self, or specific dimensions of the self.” Moore & Reid, supra note
24, at 24 (citations omitted); accord DANESI, supra note 37, at 33 (describing how the
personalities of the brands merge with those of the consumers).
71. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 124.
72. Joseph T. Plummer, How Personality Makes a Difference, 40 J. ADVERTISING RES.,
Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 79, 81 (explaining how a consumer will favor a brand that has a personality
in which the consumer sees himself); accord HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 124–25
(describing the “self-expressive value” of branding); cf. Aaker, supra note 66, at 355 (noting
congruence problems between brand and human personalities). See generally CLOTAIRE
RAPAILLE, THE CULTURE CODE 5–9 (2006) (arguing that different cultures have codes that
resonate with consumers and that companies’ brands must be congruent with those codes in
order to be successful).
73. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 138.
74. An irony here is that in some cases a corporate brand will fall into the background.
There can be three levels at work: the corporate brand, the immediate brand, and the product.
Consider as examples: General Motors, Chevrolet, Corvette; Procter and Gamble, Crest, Crest
Whitestrips; Disney, Muppets, Cookie Monster. There is a community for whom the brand
Corvette is more the central matter than the parent corporate brand GM, and so on. I thank
Professor Justin Hughes for pointing out this argument and these examples.
I would agree with Professor Hughes and go further to say that the products themselves,
such as Cookie Monster and perhaps even Crest Whitestrips, are central matters for some. Yet,
car enthusiasts are quite aware of the parent brand when comparing Chevy and Ford. With
Disney and the Muppets, Disney purchased the brand, but the rights to Muppets from Sesame
Street remain with the Sesame Workshop. See Jonathan Berr, Disney’s Muppets Purchase May
Finally Pay off with New Film, DAILYFINANCE.COM (Nov. 10, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/11/10/disneys-muppets-purchase-may-finally-pay-off-withnew-film/. How much Disney wishes to clarify its relationship with the Muppets of any type is
up to Disney. After all, this is the company that launched Touchstone Pictures to isolate its
brand from non-PG-rated movie fare. See Rod Gustafson, Is Disney Sailing into Rough Waters?,
PARENTPREVIEWS.COM (July 11, 2003), http://parentpreviews.com/the-big-picture/post/isdisney-sailing-into-rough-waters.
Corporate branding as described here reveals that different companies may use different
corporate structures and related brand-strategies either to offer the cohesive overview the
theories indicate or to try and isolate a brand. Even an isolated brand can be analyzed with the
taxonomy. And one must analyze which approach is at work if one is to assess whether any
claims—about mark holder rights, a corporate source behind the product, an anonymous source
that matters, or goodwill—make sense, and if so, to what degree.
75. LURY, supra note 45, at 121–22 (quoting Richard Branson’s explanation of branding)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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that reputation in every context. The consumer-based approach seeks to
understand how consumers conceptualize a brand and manipulate that
process so that the consumer has a positive view of the brand. The
personality approach seeks to offer brands that match consumers’
psychological needs so that they purchase the company-branded product
for its symbolic value.
In other words, if a company brands itself and manages its brand
well, it can move beyond the “4 Ps”—which a competitor could
duplicate—to a new dimension, one that cannot be copied.76 Marketing
strategy, advertising, and even packaging are all part of the brand
strategy used to communicate information and values. This brand
strategy encourages consumers to buy one company’s product over a
competitor’s for reasons other than the price or quality of the good.77
Furthermore, once a company has created such a brand, the
company can offer diffusion products. Rather than having one good at a
particular price point, a company can offer a range of goods at different
prices and market points to give a variety of people “access to the
brand.”78 In sum, the corporate brand is the lever by which a company
grabs consumers and enters markets.79 The brand is the symbol and tool
of the company, not simply a specific product or even a series of
products.80
B. The Noncorporate Side of Brands
This Section explains how noncorporate actors can shape a brand.
Although a brand begins with a corporation, it can quickly move
beyond corporate control. Once the brand is offered to the world,
consumers and communities may engage with and sometimes
reinterpret or repurpose the brand. Not all brands will have consumer
and community meanings.81 But when they do, consumers and
communities have the potential to alter the brand meaning the

76. See LURY, supra note 45, at 24, 33–34; cf. DANESI, supra note 37, at 33 (explaining
brands as personalities with identities).
77. See MOOR, supra note 57, at 18–21; cf. Erich Joachimsthaler & David A. Aaker,
Building Brands Without Mass Media, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 39 (1997) (stating that “mass-media
advertising has long been the cornerstone of most brand-building efforts”).
78. LURY, supra note 45, at 61–62.
79. Cf. McKenna, supra note 53, at 117 (discussing market entry as a potential theory of
harm for trademark holders).
80. Lury presents another way to understand this strategy in that brands enable companies
to move beyond the “4 Ps,” which a competitor could duplicate to include a fifth P, personality
of a company, which competitors could not copy. See supra note 55.
81. Indeed, whether, how much, and how many consumers and communities choose to
engage with a given brand will vary from brand to brand.
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corporation intended. Consumers and communities also open the
potential opportunity to inform and enhance a brand’s overall value.
1. Consumer Brands
Brand scholarship underwent a significant change in the mid1990s.82 It shifted from a positivistic paradigm where the company
owns the brand and pushes information to the consumer to a
constructivist or interpretive paradigm that “reflects on the nature of the
brand and the value of brand equity as something created in the
interaction between marketer and an active consumer.”83 Under the
constructivist or interpretive paradigm, the consumer has an active part
in the construction and strength of the brand.
The first major constructivist approach to branding is the relational
approach. Unlike previous approaches, it applies “an entirely qualitative
research design, and focus[es] on meaning instead of information.”84 In
addition, it understands brands as part of a dyadic system where
consumers are on an equal footing with the brand, and consumer and
brand exchange with each other equally.85 This approach implicitly
casts the brand as something partly owned by the consumer. It abandons
the input–output relationship at the heart of approaches which look to
the company as the owner of the brand.86
Like the personality approach, relational brand theory accepts that
people imbue brands with human characteristics.87 Relational brand
theory, however, goes further: “For the brand to serve as a legitimate
relationship partner, it must surpass the personification qualification and
actually behave as an active, contributing member of the dyad.”88 A
company’s intention for what a brand is or what it means does not, and
arguably cannot, capture the way in which consumers take a brand and
82. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 22–24.
83. Id. at 21; see also Fournier, supra note 25, at 344 (stating that “relationships involve
reciprocal exchange between active and interdependent relationship partners”).
84. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 153.
85. See id. at 154; Fournier, supra note 25, at 344; Susan Fournier, A Meaning-Based
Framework for the Study of Consumer-Object Relations, 18 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 736,
740 (1991) (offering a framework that encompasses the way in which a product can have a
range of meanings for consumers from the “subjective, symbolic” to the “objective, tangible”);
cf. Beebe, supra note 11, at 634 (discussing dyadic nature of signs in Ferdinand de Saussure’s
semiotic theory).
86. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 154; cf. Beebe, supra note 11, at 630 (arguing
that semiotics “holds that no element of experience is meaningful in itself”). To be clear, this
conception of ownership does not trump the corporation’s claims to the mark; instead it accepts
that as symbols, trademarks can be subject to consumers’ ability to take and interpret the mark
in a personal ownership way.
87. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 156; Fournier, supra note 25, at 345
88. Fournier, supra note 25, at 345.
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make it part of their lives.89 As Professor Susan Fournier explains,
people are “not just buying brands because they like them or because
they work well. They are involved in relationships with a collectivity of
brands so as to benefit from the meanings they add into their lives.
Some of these meanings are functional and utilitarian; others are more
psychological and emotional.”90
This shift in understanding the brand poses problems for the
traditional brand manager. Rather than a distinct, prescribed method for
applying the relational approach, business literature offers guidelines for
managing a relational brand.91 In a relational approach, management
must first understand that the brand’s meaning will vary with each
consumer depending on the consumer’s place in his or her life. In
addition, management needs to have a high degree of intimacy with its
customers so it can understand “the context in which . . . products and
services are used in the course of . . . customers’ day-to-day lives.”92
This view of brands acknowledges, however, that if management
only gathers data from consumers and never provides space for the
consumer to act on the brand on his own, consumers will turn on the
brand.93 Excessive data gathering, ignoring privacy, seeking to own the
customer to the exclusion of other brands, or any other behavior that
undermines the dyadic relationship, harms the relational brand and
moves it away from a friendly interaction between equals.94
In other words, management and marketing must let go of the brand
and let it exist in the subjective “chaotic” hands of each customer.95 The
advantage of this approach is that it releases management from the
“unnecessarily restrictive and inherently limiting” view of brand loyalty
and permits management to enhance its brand strategy.96 In a relational
approach, management can study consumers’ “actual brand behaviors”
with a more accurate understanding of how brand personality “is
89. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 155; Fournier, supra note 25, at 367.
90. Fournier, supra note 25, at 361; accord Dreyfuss, supra note 22; see also AuTomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Consumers sometimes buy products bearing marks such as the Nike Swoosh, the Playboy
bunny ears, the Mercedes tri-point star, the Ferrari stallion, and countless sports franchise logos,
for the appeal of the mark itself, without regard to whether it signifies the origin or sponsorship
of the product.”).
91. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 171 (describing certain guidelines).
92. Susan Fournier et al., Preventing the Premature Death of Relationship Marketing, 76
HARV. BUS. REV. 42, 49 (1998).
93. Id. at 43–44.
94. Id.; accord James H. McAlexander et al., Building Brand Community, 66 J.
MARKETING 38, 51 (2002) (“In addition, marketers should recognize that relationships are
reciprocal: Both parties give and receive.”); HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 172.
95. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 175.
96. Fournier, supra note 25, at 368.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5

1002

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

created, developed, and changed over time . . . thus enabling an
important and sought-after link between managerial action and
consumer response.”97
2. Community Brands
The community approach to brands asks what happens when
individual customers connect and form groups.98 This perspective
addresses the way in which either face-to-face or technology-based
sharing of positive and negative information through social networks—
from facts to impressions to rumors—affects brands.99 More precisely,
this approach defines a brand community as “a specialized, nongeographically bound community, based on a structured set of social
relationships among admirers of a brand.”100
A given brand community collectively negotiates with companies
regarding the brand.101 The members of a brand community experience
a connection to the brand, but they experience an even stronger bond
with the other members of the brand community.102 In some cases, the
marketer fosters these communities by encouraging and endorsing
events (for example, Harley-Davidson rallies), and members share the
brand meaning with the marketer.103 In other cases, an existing marketer
97. Id.
98. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 183. One theorist has argued:
[T]he value-expressive dimension of brand names, suggests that brand name
usage performs a valuable social function by engendering feelings of
community on the part of those who share the brand identification. This
facilitation of group affiliation seems especially important in light of the loss of
community that is said to commonly accompany life in complex societies such
as contemporary America.
Monroe Friedman, The Changing Language of Consumer Society: Brand Name Usage in
Popular American Novels in the Postwar Era, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 927, 936 (1985).
99. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 182–83.
100. Albert M. Muniz, Jr. & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Brand Community, 21 J. CONSUMER RES.
412, 412 (2001); accord René Algesheimer et al., The Social Influence of Brand Community:
Evidence from European Car Clubs, 69 J. MARKETING 19, 19 (2005). But see McAlexander,
supra note 94, at 39 (arguing that brand communities are dynamic and may be geographically
scattered or “may even exist in the entirely nongeographical space of the Internet”).
101. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 187.
102. See, e.g., Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 414 (arguing that the Harley example
is a subculture that operates within a different construct than the brand community); cf.
Algesheimer et al., supra note 100, at 19 (stating that “identification with the brand community
leads to positive consequences, such as greater community engagement, and negative
consequences, such as normative community pressure and (ultimately) reactance”).
103. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 188; Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 414;
HOLT, supra note 56, at 156–57 (questioning the corporate role in this community branding
event).
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deploys the brand, but the community and the marketer co-create the
brand meaning (for example, customer-started clubs and Web
groups).104 One other variation operates with the community marketing
the brand and creating its meaning (for example, Linux).105
Brand communities present managers with opportunities and
problems that are much larger than those recognized by the relational
approach. The collective aspect of community brands provides greater
leverage and a louder voice regarding a brand than the dispersed,
subjective nature at the core of the relational approach.106 A potential
benefit to the company comes from the way in which a community can
be extremely loyal and promote the brand in ways that are quite
influential, at times verging on evangelical zeal.107 This kind of group is
almost a marketer’s dream, as the group is less likely to switch brands
and often generates repeat purchases of the same item and across the
brand in general.108 If the community decides, however, that
management has taken a wrong turn, erred in its brand message, or
transgressed the community’s vision in some way, the community can
spread rumors about the brand, attack the marketer’s vision, and in
some cases effectively hijack the brand to redirect its course to where
management does not desire.109 The powerful Apple brand faced this
problem in 1998 when it chose to abandon its Newton brand and move
to the iMac and iPod brands. Loyal Newton fans created Web-based
marketing and technical support for Newton consisting of 200,000
supporters at its peak and continuing its vibrancy into the mid-2000s.110
Nonetheless, by studying the way in which a brand community
shapes the brand for the community itself, management can discern
what consumers think about a brand and what the brand means to that
community.111 This information allows the company to use latent brand
power to resurrect a product (for example, the VW Beetle), align current
products with the community’s views, and develop new products based
104. McAlexander et al., supra note 94, at 38 (stating that “[w]e found consumers and
marketers jointly building communities”); cf. Algesheimer, supra note 100, at 30 (finding that
when a company tried to draft new or potential customers into a brand community, such efforts
were less effective because the customers were not already fully engaged with the brand).
105. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 190.
106. See Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 426–27.
107. Id. at 427; McAlexander, supra note 94, at 43–44 (applying ethnography to a Jeep
brand event, Jeep Jamboree, and noting “enthusiasm” and the “fervent expression of missionary
zeal” by some participants); accord HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 197.
108. See Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427.
109. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 197.
110. See Albert M. Muñiz Jr. & Hope Jensen Schau, Religiosity in the Abandoned Apple
Newton Brand Community, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 737, 737–38 (2005); accord HEDING ET AL.,
supra note 42, at 184.
111. Muñiz & Schau, supra note 110, at 738.
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on the community meaning.112 But just as the relational approach
requires that management respect the individual, brand communities
require that management should not overstep its bounds through actions
such as spying on the community, pushing or manipulating it, inserting
members into the community, selling into the community, or otherwise
exploiting the community-developed brand mystique because such acts
will offend the community.113
In sum, the brand community approach sees brands as “social
objects,” “socially constructed,” and “created as much by consumers as
marketers.”114 Made up of loyal consumers, the brand community
affects all aspects of how the brand is seen by spreading both positive
and negative impressions about the brand.115 Companies with strong
brand communities can rely on them to maintain the relationship
between the company and multiple consumers without the company
having to maintain as many one-on-one relationships.116 In place of a
one-way dictatorial system for brands, the community approach
presents a democratic understanding of brands.117
It seems, however, that we have two dimensions of brands that may
never connect: the corporate and the noncorporate. Despite the
evolution of brand theory regarding consumers and communities, some
may think that the noncorporate dimensions of brands have little to say
to a corporation and the marketplace. And one may think that
noncorporate actors care little for what the corporation offers regarding
a brand. Yet recent scholarship on the co-creation of value shows the
opposite to be true.
The idea of co-creation has taken hold in many fields, such as the
open source movement, innovation and tool kit theory, and
marketing.118 As business strategy and marketing Professors C.K.
Prahalad and Venkat Ramaswamy explain, at a general level:
112. See, e.g., Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427 (describing how Saab responded
to community feedback regarding changes).
113. Id. at 415, 424, 427 (noting consumers are sensitive to authenticity problems in
consumer culture and documenting brand community reactions to shift in corporate
management and strategy); HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 198–99.
114. Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427–28; see also Schau et al., supra note 41, at
30 (arguing that the new revolution of co-creation of the brand is occurring).
115. Albert M. Muñiz Jr. & Hope Jensen Schau, Vigilante Marketing and ConsumerCreated Communications, 36 J. ADVERTISING 187, 187 (2007) (“Consumers creating such
content are acting as self-appointed promoters of the brand and often have firm convictions
regarding what is right and wrong for it.”); accord Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427.
116. See Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427.
117. Id. at 428.
118. See, e.g., James Bessen, Open Source Software: Free Provision of Complex Public
Goods, in THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 57, 67 (Jürgen Bitzer &
Philipp J.H. Schröder eds., 2006) (describing the problem of creating a specific iteration of
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The meaning of value and the process of value creation are
rapidly shifting from a product- and firm-centric view to
personalized consumer experiences. Informed, networked,
empowered, and active consumers are increasingly cocreating value with the firm. The interaction between the
firm and the consumer is becoming the locus of value
creation and value extraction.119
Modern brand practices and strategies have embraced this outlook.
Brand theory’s cultural understanding of brands combined with an
information network perspective offers a full picture of brands where
corporations and active consumers co-create value.
C. Synthesis: The Cultural, Networked Brand
The cultural approach to branding explains the dynamic, co-creative
nature of brands. Cultural theory understood culture as a toolkit for
some time prior to the adoption of this view in the business literature.
Professor Ann Swidler’s groundbreaking article, Culture in Action:
Symbols and Strategies, argues that culture provides “tool kit[s]” for
certain “strategies of action” and that “both the influence and the fate of
cultural meanings depend on the strategies of action they support.”120 In
the tool kit understanding of culture, “how culture shapes or constrains
action, and more generally, how culture interacts with social
structure . . . var[ies] across time and historical situation.”121
Recent work has argued that brands are cultural artifacts that
function in ways that conform to Swidler’s theory. Douglas Holt, a
leader of the cultural approach to branding, explains:

complex software); Nikolaus Franke & Frank Piller, Value Creation by Toolkits for User
Innovation and Design: The Case of the Watch Market, 21 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 401,
402 (2004) (comparing the practices of releasing a product and toolkit in different industries and
finding “[t]he rationale underlying the toolkit, however, is the same: it allows the customer to
take an active part in product development”); C.K. Prahalad & Venkat Ramaswamy, CoCreation Experiences: The Next Practice in Value Creation, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 5,
10–13 (2004) (describing co-creation in interactive marketing); Stefan Thomke & Eric von
Hippel, Customers as Innovators: A New Way to Create Value, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 74 passim
(2002) (describing a form of co-creation); Stephen L. Vargo & Robert F. Lusch, Evolving to a
New Dominant Logic for Marketing, 68 J. MARKETING 1, 1, 12 (2004) (describing co-creation in
marketing).
119. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 5.
120. Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 273, 273,
284 (1986); see also Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 263, 268
(1997) (arguing that cognitive research “reinforces the ‘toolkit’” view of culture).
121. Swidler, supra note 120, at 284.
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Consumers will look for brands to contribute directly to
their identity projects by providing original and relevant
cultural materials with which to work. So brands will
become another form of expressive culture, no different in
principle from films or television programs or rock bands
(which, in turn, are increasingly treated and perceived as
brands). Brands that create worlds that strike consumers’
imaginations, that inspire and provoke and stimulate, that
help them interpret the world that surrounds them, will earn
kudos and profits.122
The brand must be part of shaping mainstream culture, but it is also
“subjected to social and cultural changes.”123
In the cultural theory approach to brands, brands change and move
through time124: “[T]he brand is a vessel of meaning and myth making,
successful only if it resonates with consumers’ collective identity
projects of the time.”125 In short, brands can have an effect on culture,
and culture can have an effect on brands. Brand managers seek to
understand the social and cultural currents of a given time and then
generate a story to fit that moment.
Of course, as consumers or communities bond with a brand, they
may begin to criticize the brand.126 For example, the antibrand or “No
Logo” movement provides strong criticism of branding.127 Naomi
Klein, author of No Logo, makes a strong case that brands in general
pose significant problems for society—from changing the availability of
open space for expression, to reducing meaningful choice in the
marketplace, to altering labor mechanisms such that high-paying jobs
are scarce and labor is exploited in developing countries.128
The movement advocates culture jamming—the distortion of brand
images and messages and the overt rejection of consumerism—as a way

122. Douglas B. Holt, Why Do Brands Cause Trouble? A Dialectical Theory of Consumer
Culture and Branding, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 70, 87 (2002).
123. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 211.
124. HOLT, supra note 56, at 215; cf. Swidler, supra note 120, at 284.
125. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 210.
126. See Craig J. Thomson et al., Emotional Branding and the Strategic Value of the
Doppelganger Brand Image, 70 J. MARKETING 50, 51–52 (2006).
127. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO passim (2002) (describing the No Logo movement);
accord Holt, supra note 122, at 70 (noting Klein’s book, Kalle Lasn’s book and magazine
Adbusters, and Eric Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation as part of the antibrand movement); see also
KYLE BAGWELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING 99 (2005) (noting that part of the
antibrand movement’s concern is that corporate culture is displacing bottom-up culture);
HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 220–21 (describing the No Logo movement).
128. See KLEIN, supra note 127.
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to allow people to shape culture and comment on corporate practices.129
Part of culture jamming may entail creating a doppelgänger brand, “a
family of disparaging images and stories about a brand that are
circulated in popular culture by a loosely organized network of
consumers, antibrand activists, bloggers, and opinion leaders in the
news and entertainment media.”130
In addition, this group’s sensitivity to corporate power has fostered
monitoring agendas, which scrutinize corporate impact on social issues
such as labor and the environment.131 This action has spurred corporate
awareness and in some cases greater attention to corporate social
responsibility. In Holt’s words, “Today, culture jamming is more
frequently used to attack disjunctures between brand promises and
corporate actions.”132
One might argue that in the antibrand context, “[i]nformed,
networked, empowered, and active consumers” seem to be
“increasingly [destroying] value with the firm. The interaction between
the firm and the consumer is becoming the locus of value [loss].”133
Indeed, as discussed later in this Article, a common response to many
brand critical acts is to cry foul and try to stifle such commentary by
claiming that the acts cause trademark confusion, dilution, or both.134
That perspective, however, clings to a product- or producer-centered
view of brands, in which goods and information are under corporate
control in a one-way system.
Negative information offered from the noncorporate side may be
more important than positive information. Some brand literature argues
that antibrand acts, especially the emergence of doppelgänger brands—
reinterpretations of a brand that present disparaging images and
meanings—are useful sources of information for business and brand
strategy:
[A] doppelgänger brand image functions as a diagnostic
tool that can reveal latent brand image problems that could
eventually blossom into a full-fledged brand image crisis.
More specifically, the analysis of a doppelgänger brand
image can (1) call attention to cultural contradictions that
could potentially undermine the perceived authenticity of a
129. See Holt, supra note 122, at 85.
130. See Thomson et al., supra note 126, at 50.
131. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 218, 220, 221.
132. Holt, supra note 122, at 85.
133. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 5.
134. See Thomson et al., supra note 126, at 50; see also Deven R. Desai & Sandra L.
Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2007)
(discussing the growth of aggressive trademark litigation).
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firm’s emotional branding strategy, (2) provide early
warning signs that an emotional-branding story is
beginning to lose its value as an authenticating narrative for
consumers’ identity projects, and (3) offer insights into
how an emotional-branding strategy can be reconfigured to
fit better with changing cultural times and shifting
consumer outlooks.135
Insofar as a company offers and trades information about the benefits of
its brand—from product quality, to image, to identity, to emotional,
relationship, to socially responsible production methods, or any other
benefit—the doppelgänger brand and similar commentaries by
consumers and communities offer valuable information regarding how
the brand offering is received.
Furthermore when brands function as two-way information
resources, it opens the possibility of co-creating value:
As consumers peel away the brand veneer, they are looking
for companies that act like a local merchant, as a stalwart
citizen of the community. What consumers will want to
touch, soon enough, is the way in which companies treat
people when they are not customers. Brands will be trusted
to serve as cultural source materials when their sponsors
have demonstrated that they shoulder civic responsibilities
as would a community pillar.136
In other words, the brand is a key vehicle by which a company
communicates with society. And in turn, the brand is a key vehicle by
which society communicates with a company.
As consumers have become more aware of corporate behavior and
its impact on society, authenticity and openness have taken a central
role in what is demanded from a brand.137 Rather than the cool,
135. See Thomson et al., supra note 126, at 51. Although the doppelgänger idea is couched
in terms of emotional branding, there is no reason that it cannot apply to any brand. As
Professor Sonia Katyal has noted, antibranding practices similar to doppelgänger practices may
target a specific brand while also targeting general social matters, such as questioning alcohol
consumption, the use of child labor, the cigarette industry, and commitments to alternative
energy. See Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 58 BUFFALO L. REV. 795, 807–09 (2010). Such acts can inform a company that
certain practices are not favored by at least some of the populace.
136. Holt, supra note 122, at 88.
137. See Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 8 (stating that “[c]onsumers expect
transparency”); cf. Isabelle Maignan & O.C. Ferrell, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Marketing: An Integrative Framework, 32 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 3, 8 (2004) (noting the
transparency of financial information).
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manipulative brand that pretends profits are not part of the corporate
agenda, corporations can, and perhaps must, be transparent about what
they are doing and acknowledge their duty to improve society in
general.
In market terms, the brand is an information device and part of a
network consisting of the product, the corporation, the consumer, and
the community. The new reality is that a company’s ability to have full
command and control over the brand is diminished, if not gone
completely. Instead, brands are subject to ongoing interaction and
definition. The company and its product may initiate the relationship,
but power diffuses after that moment. Consumers and communities
ultimately create value specific to themselves and simultaneously create
the opportunity for value creation on the company side.
Thus, the use of the term “side” is arguably incorrect. Prahalad and
Ramaswamy offer that “[t]he interaction between the firm and the
consumer is becoming the locus of value creation and value extraction”
for all connected to the brand.138 There are sides, but they work in a
symbiotic, not antagonistic, manner.
II. A BRAND THEORY EXPLANATION OF TRADEMARK LAW
Trademark law protects the corporate dimensions of brands but is
not clear as to how and why it does so. As trademark law has evolved,
the claimed search cost, utilitarian goals of trademark had to be relaxed
if not twisted to achieve protection of the corporate brand interests.
Fundamental parts of trademark law can be explained as protecting and
growing the corporate dimension of brands, rather than adhering to a
search cost theory of trademarks. For example, the anonymous source
doctrine and concept of goodwill grew to support the corporate side of
brands. In addition, several doctrinal puzzles within trademark law that
are difficult to reconcile with the traditional law and economics
explanation of trademarks139 are easily understood from a brand
perspective. These aspects further demonstrate how trademark law is an
unwitting servant of the corporate side of brands.

138. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 5.
139. As Beebe has put it, insofar as trademark theory rests easy and relies on law and
economics it “cannot explain, predict, or justify certain outcomes in [trademark] law, nor can it
articulate the need for necessary reforms.” See Beebe, supra note 11, at 624 (arguing that law
and economics cannot explain the “concepts of trademark ‘distinctiveness’ and trademark
‘dilution’”).
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A. From Direct Competition to Anonymous Source
The law and economics view of trademarks tracks early brand
scholarship’s view of product brands almost exactly.140 Early brand
scholarship looked at the brand as product-related; the brand reduces
search costs so consumers can process information quickly as they
decide what to purchase.141 Professor William Landes and Judge
Richard Posner summarize and conflate how trademarks and brands
function:
[A] trademark conveys information that allows the
consumer to say to himself, “I need not investigate the
attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the
trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the
attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed
earlier.”142
The views are so close that leading marketing theorists often also
conflate brands and trademarks by defining a brand as “a name,
trademark, logo, or other symbol.”143
Yet, in the beginning, trademark law was supposed to protect
against “directly competing products and passing off or source
confusion.”144 The U.S. Supreme Court’s explanation of a trademark’s
purpose in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf captures the essence of
the strict source doctrine: “to identify the origin or ownership of the
article to which it is affixed.”145 In a world of limited travel and local
production, the strict source doctrine—the doctrine holding that
consumers “knew or cared to know the actual source of the brand they
were buying”146—may have matched how brands functioned in the
marketplace. But as the economy shifted to mass production and
140. The economic rationale behind trademark law is that trademarks should be protected
because they are economically efficient; trademarks help to minimize consumers’ search costs,
the pre-purchase analysis a consumer performs to make her purchase decision. See, e.g., Ann
Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 729–30 (2004); Stephen L. Carter,
The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990).
141. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 33.
142. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 269.
143. PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 404 (2000). David Aaker argues that a
brand is “a distinguishing name and/or symbol (such as a logo, trademark, or package design)
intended to identify the goods or services of either one seller or a group of sellers, and to
differentiate those goods or services from those of competitors.” DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING
BRAND EQUITY: CAPITALIZING ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND NAME 7 (1991).
144. Bone, supra note 8, at 593; see also Glynn Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48
EMORY L.J. 367, 391 (1999); Nelson, supra note 52, at 742–44.
145. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916).
146. Beebe, supra note 11, at 678.
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distribution on a national scale, this doctrine became suspect.147 Once
companies moved beyond direct competition, trademark theory and law
struggled to find a way to explain what trademarks protect.
Within a decade of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hanover Star
Milling Co., Frank Schechter argued that “the ramifications of modern
trade and the national and international distribution of goods from the
manufacturer through the jobber or importer and the retailer to the
consumer, [created a situation where] the source or origin of the goods
bearing a well known trademark is seldom known to the consumer.”148
By the 1930s, national manufacturers had established their brands, and
trademark law began protecting those interests. Responding to the facts
that Schechter presented—that no one knew the source—courts
embraced the anonymous source doctrine.
The doctrine holds that a trademark must represent a single source,
but consumers do not have to know the precise origin of a good. 149 It
implicitly recognizes that consumers look to a product brand rather than
the corporate source as they make purchasing decisions. As Professor
Barton Beebe has shown, the doctrine allows for the creation of
hypermarks, which “are not designations of source, but commodified
simulations of such designations. . . . Their sign value is the source of
their economic value.”150 In other words, the mark itself is the thing
which has value and is purchased. Here, the mark becomes the
product—which is quite a brand way of looking at trademarks.
B. An Expansive View of Goodwill, Merchandising, and Licensing
A core doctrine in trademark law, the goodwill doctrine, exemplifies
how trademark law supports the shift from a product-level to a
corporate-level brand. The rise of the idea of goodwill as it relates to
trademarks tracks brand logic better than competition and search cost
rationales. Trademark law holds that marks have no intrinsic value;
rather, they are symbols of goodwill.151 Trademarks do not have
property rights in gross with the same strong exclusionary and
147. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the
Firm, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 353 (2009); Lars Smith, Trade Distinctiveness: Solving
Scalia’s Tertium Quid Trade Dress Conundrum, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 243, 260.
148. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 814 (1927) (citing McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877), and Charles Broadway Rouss,
Inc. v. Winchester Co., 300 F. 706, 722–23 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 607 (1924));
accord LURY, supra note 45, at 19 (describing early brand strategy as seeking to “circumvent or
limit the role of the retailer”).
149. Beebe, supra note 11, at 678.
150. Id. at 669.
151. See Bone, supra note 8, at 560 (“The locus of the property eventually shifted from the
mark itself to the value underlying the mark, which was called ‘goodwill.’”).
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temporary monopoly power that patent and copyright law enjoy.152
Instead, “the trademark holder’s right to prohibit others’ use of the mark
is limited to circumstances in which that use harms consumers, as
determined via the ‘likelihood of confusion’ standard.”153
Yet, cases in the 1930s and 1940s enjoined the use of marks even
when direct competition and source confusion over products—the
touchstones of early trademark law154—were lacking.155 To explain this
shift, courts had to fashion a new way of understanding what
trademarks represent while trying to maintain its claimed foundation in
protecting consumers and reducing search costs. Professor Robert Bone
has explained that this new approach “focused on the goodwill that a
mark symbolized and protected that goodwill as the seller’s property.
This goodwill-as-property theory was flexible enough to support broad
trademark protection provided ‘goodwill’ was defined to include
goodwill that attached to the firm as well as to the particular brand.”156
Courts were protecting firm-level interests, not product-level ones.
Nonetheless, courts held that one could not assign a mark without
the goodwill, because to allow assignment without goodwill would
permit one company to use the mark but change the product, and this
practice would disrupt the public’s ability to rely on the mark as a
conveyor of information about a certain product.157 Until the 1930s,
courts often required the transfer of the entire business.158 Short of that
requirement, courts frequently required the transfer of the means of
production or some type of tangible asset as part of a mark assignment,
and they invalidated assignments if the original mark holder continued
to make similar products, even under a different mark.159
The ban on assignment without goodwill comes from an era when
the product was the key to the transaction. That idea is ill-suited to a
152. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (“In truth, a
trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means
for facilitating the protection of one’s good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or
symbol—a commercial signature—upon the merchandise or package in which it is sold.”);
accord Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413–14 (1916).
153. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 134, at 1801.
154. Bone, supra note 8, at 593 (noting that “directly competing products and passing off
or source confusion” described most trademark cases prior to 1920); accord Lunney, supra note
144, at 391; Nelson, supra note 52, at 742–44.
155. See Bone, supra note 8, at 595–96; accord Nelson, supra note 52, at 742–44.
156. Bone, supra note 8, at 493 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); cf. Lunney, supra
note 144, at 371–72 (explaining the growth of “property mania” in trademark law (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
157. See Lunney, supra note 144, at 410.
158. See Lisa H. Johnston, Note, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85
TRADEMARK REP. 19, 23–24 (1995).
159. See Lunney, supra note 144, at 410.
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world where intangible assets, especially corporate brands and other
levels of branding, are the concern. But, as Bone observes, “Goodwill
protection has nothing directly to do with facilitating consumer choice
or safeguarding the quality of market information.”160 That was and is
the point.
From the beginning of corporate branding in the 1920s, business
interests argued that the prohibition of assignment of a mark without
goodwill needed to be relaxed. When the Lanham Act was passed in
1946, the law changed so that “a mark, and its goodwill, could be
assigned separately from the business, thus incorporating some of the
ideas of those who advocated free trademark transferability.”161 By the
1970s, courts had dropped most of the narrow requirements of the past,
and marks were allowed to be transferred without any tangible assets in
tow as long as the new mark holder’s products were substantially
similar to the previous holder’s products. By the 1990s, these standards
were further relaxed, and new mark holder products only needed to be
sufficiently similar and sometimes could be on entirely different
products as long as consumers were not confused.162 These more recent
changes occurred just as the business world began to recognize that a
large portion of a company’s value lay in its brand.163
Trademark doctrine’s move to include confusion over sponsorship is
another example of the move from product to corporate branding.
Embracing a broad notion of sponsorship “expanded the range of
actionable confusion beyond confusion over the actual source of a
product—trademark law’s traditional concern—to include claims
against uses that might confuse consumers about whether the trademark
owner sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant’s goods.”164 Courts
explained this new level of protection came from the belief that
trademark law should protect against the “loss of current customers due
160. Bone, supra note 8, at 549.
161. See Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time
Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 786 (2005). But see Lunney, supra note 144, at 411–12
(arguing that the rejection of specific language allowing such transfers indicates that courts have
ignored the rule against assignment in gross).
162. Cf. Carter, supra note 140, at 785–86 (criticizing the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988 for “effectively eliminat[ing] the traditional restriction on the transfer of a mark in gross,
and thereby creat[ing] a potential market in trademarks—the very creature the Lanham Act’s
original sponsors long ago promised that Federal rights would not create”); Calboli, supra note
161, at 791–93 (discussing cases that used the sufficient similarity standard to allow
assignments that are arguably in gross).
163. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
164. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 12, at 414 (emphasis added); cf. Bone, supra note 8,
at 493 (“The way a defendant injured or appropriated a plaintiff’s firm goodwill was by
confusing consumers about sponsorship. Therefore, protecting a mark against sponsorship
confusion prevented harm to the seller at the same time as preventing harm to the consumer.”).
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to a reputation injury created by defendant’s lower quality product, or
loss of future customers due to the plaintiff’s inability to enter a new
market with its mark.”165
This understanding fits well within the corporate brand perspective.
Brand scholarship explicitly takes the view that a brand is built around a
reputation and a company, “not around products.”166 Corporate brand
strategy sees the brand as a vehicle that allows a corporation to create
diffusion products; thus, a company can offer not just one product but a
range of goods and services at different prices and market points so that
a range of people can have “access to the brand.”167 When trademark
doctrine protects a company’s ability to enter new markets, the doctrine
maps to the idea that a corporation will wish to leverage its corporate
brand to offer products across a range of new market segments.
Furthermore, if trademark law took source and quality protection
seriously, merchandising and licensing would have been cabined or
possibly banned. Trademark law ostensibly prohibits pure
merchandising or naked licensing of a mark because these practices
would arguably harm the mark’s role in offering information about the
source and quality of goods or services. In practice, however, trademark
law permits precisely these behaviors. Businesses operating under a
brand view of marks benefit from this permissive approach.
Professor Irene Calboli’s work helps show the problem. The
following amalgam blends her hypothetical examples on trademark
licensing and assignment in gross to show the realities of how many
businesses operate and the brand environment consumers encounter:
Imagine that you are seated in the STARBUCKS coffee
shop in front of your school sipping your coffee from a
STARBUCKS mug. The coffee tastes richer than usual;
you then notice a label on the shop door, and on your
coffee cup, announcing that a new owner has purchased the
mark STARBUCKS and has changed the quality of some
of the STARBUCKS products. Throughout the rest of the
day you see people wearing branded clothing, a HARLEYDAVIDSON T-shirt here, a YANKEES hat there.
Now, imagine that a South-African corporation has
165. Bone, supra note 8, at 599 (citing Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132
F.2d. 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427,
429 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.)); cf. Nelson, supra note 52, at 743–45.
166. See LURY, supra note 45, at 122 (quoting KLEIN, supra note 127, at 22) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. at 25, 61–62 (quoting Christopher M. Moore, Streets of Style: Fashion Designer
Retailing Within London and New York, in COMMERCIAL CULTURES: ECONOMIES, PRACTICES,
SPACES 261, 269 (Peter Jackson et al. eds., 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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acquired the Coca-Cola Company and announces that it
will not continue to produce the well-known soft drink.
Instead, it will use the mark COCA-COLA on a variety of
salty snacks.168
One may encounter a range of branded goods, but whether those goods
are from the original source, whether the company manufactured the
goods, and whether the goods have anything to do with a company’s
core goods or services are open questions each time one encounters the
brand.
Put simply, companies seek to extend their brands. Licensing is a
key way to accomplish this goal and can be quite lucrative.169 As
Calboli explains, one can think of three types of licensing: licensing,
where a company outsources manufacture of its products; collateral
licensing, where a company allows another company to produce a
related good with the company’s mark (such as GE, an appliance
company, permitting another company to produce phones); and
promotional or trademark merchandising licensing, where a company
brands products unrelated to its products, such as hats, water, and coffee
mugs.170
Yet prior to the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, trademark law
traditionally disfavored trademark licensing.171 Just as one could not
assign a mark, one could not, in theory, lend a mark. Marks were
supposed to indicate origin. Licensing a mark to another logically
undercuts that function.172 The MacMahan rule explains the point:

168. The above hypothetical includes both direct quotes and paraphrases from Irene
Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” In Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
341, 342 (2007) [hereinafter Calboli, Sunset], and Calboli, supra note 161, at 772. I thank
Professor Irene Calboli for allowing me to adapt her examples for this Article.
169. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory
or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 461 (2005) (“Trademark merchandising is big business.
One marketing consultant estimated the global market for licensing and marketing sports-related
merchandise at $17 billion in 2001. The college-logo retail market was estimated at $3 billion in
2003. The 2002 Salt Lake Olympics generated $500 million in gross sales—and $34 million in
licensing revenues—from sale of ‘Olympics’ attire.” (footnotes omitted)); Alfred M. Marks,
Trademark Licensing—Towards a More Flexible Standard, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 645–47
(1988) (detailing the economic value of trademark licensing in the billions of dollars); Kevin
Parks, “Naked” Is Not a Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the “Quality Control
Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 558 (1992) (“Trademark
licensing is an accepted, widespread business practice which has and will continue to grow
exponentially, adding tens of billions of dollars to the national and international economies.”).
170. See Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 348–50.
171. See Marks, supra note 169, at 643–44 (citing Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores,
Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959)).
172. See Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 344.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5

1016

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

A trade-mark cannot be assigned, or its use licensed, except
as incidental to a transfer of the business or property in
connection with which it has been used. An assignment or
license without such a transfer is totally inconsistent with
the theory upon which the value of a trade-mark depends
and its appropriation by an individual is permitted. The
essential value of a trade-mark is that it identifies to the
trade the merchandise upon which it appears as of a certain
origin, or as the property of a certain person.173
Regardless, courts often allowed licensing as long as the company
monitored the licensee to ensure consistent quality of goods and the
contract for the license had language explicitly permitting such
control.174
The Lanham Act explicitly allowed licensing to related
companies,175 provided that quality control was maintained; but neither
the case law nor the statute provided guidance regarding the proper
amount of control.176 Instead, “courts progressively relaxed the
interpretation of the control that licensors must exercise over their
licensees and held that first ‘adequate,’ then ‘sufficient,’ and then
‘minimal’ control was sufficient to fulfill the statutory requirement.”177
Merchandising licensing is simply not about the origin or source of
a product. Rather, it is about how a consumer uses a branded good “to

173. MacMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474–75 (8th Cir.
1901).
174. See Marks, supra note 169, at 643; see also Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 344
(“Judicial decisions [previous to the passage of the Lanham Act] paved the way for this shift,
accepting that trademarks could indicate commercial origin not only as actual product sources,
but also in terms of consumers’ expectations by guaranteeing that all products bearing the same
mark shared the same quality regardless of the manufacturer.”); David J. Franklyn, The
Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licensors and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 (1999) (noting that trademarks as guarantees were a function of
satisfaction, not quality, but that the quality view took hold and remained the dominant
understanding).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006).
176. See Radiance A. Walters, Partial Forfeiture: The Best Compromise in Trademark
Licensing Protocol, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 126, 131 (2009) (“[T]he Lanham Act
does not explicitly define quality control. As a result, courts have interpreted the meaning of
quality control inconsistently, which has led to an ambiguous standard for validating trademark
licensing.”); accord Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 345 (“[L]ike the judiciary before its
adoption, the statute neither provided a definition of ‘quality’ and ‘control’ nor indicated how
much control must be used for licensing to be valid. As a result, courts continued to interpret the
requirement case by case.”).
177. Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 346.
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identify with the trademark owner.”178 The combination of the reduction
of control standards to “minimal” and the growth of licensing,
especially merchandising licensing, stretches the claim that a mark
indicates source and quality arguably to its breaking point.
Furthermore, although consumers can know full well that a branded
item is not licensed—they are not confused nor do they lack information
as they purchase—trademark law will prevent unlicensed manufacturers
from producing such goods.179 Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v.
Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing180 is the key case in this shift.181
In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
unlicensed manufacture of embroidered National Hockey League team
emblems was a trademark violation even though consumers were not
confused.182 The court’s explanation reveals the brand trend in this area
of trademark law:
[T]he district court overlooked the fact that the act was
amended to eliminate the source of origin as being the only
focal point of confusion. . . . [I]t can be argued, the buyer is
not confused or deceived. This argument misplaces the
purpose of the confusion requirement. The confusion or
deceit requirement is met by the fact that the defendant
duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the
public knowing that the public would identify them as
being the teams’ trademarks. The certain knowledge of the
buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols
were in plaintiffs [sic] satisfies the requirement of the act.
The argument that confusion must be as to the source of the
manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where
the trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering
mechanism for the sale of the emblem.183
First, the Lanham Act itself expanded to move beyond source to include
sponsorship or affiliation as a basis for infringement. Second, that shift
allows one to conclude that consumers are buying the product because it

178. W.J. Keating, Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has Come,
89 DICK. L. REV. 363, 372 (1985).
179. See Calboli, supra note 161, at 799; see also LURY, supra note 45, at 108 (explaining
that British trademark law was revised in 1994 to allow trafficking in a mark which is analogous
to the U.S. merchandising right).
180. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).
181. Parks, supra note 169, at 565–66; accord Dogan & Lemley, supra note 169, at 473–
74.
182. Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1008–09, 1012.
183. Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).
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bears the mark.184 The purchase is “triggered” by the mark being on the
good in question. Confusion is not the problem; trademark law now
protects the mark being bought and sold as a commodity.185
Protecting this approach to marked products fits into the brand view
of trademarks far better than the trademark view. Source is no longer an
issue. Quality control is now minimal and, perhaps as a de facto matter,
abandoned by courts as they defer to the realities of business
practices.186 Insofar as companies use brands to build relationships with
customers and offer them ways to embrace the brand as a way of life in
many if not all parts of their lives, merchandising rights cases protect a
company’s interest in generating and controlling consumer identity.
Consumers may want to express themselves through wearing a good
with a mark. Having a generous trademark law that protects a
company’s ability to exploit that identity value protects a corporate
brand interest, not a source or quality interest.
Once a company attains success with its licensing strategies, it
increases its overall value.187 After all, if people are buying a brand as a
brand, then that brand has value. Indeed, well before modern
assessments of brand value developed,188 companies asserted that
brands were worth millions of dollars. In one case, a company asserted
that a brand accounted for close to twenty percent of a company’s
value.189 Furthermore, from the late 1980s onwards, “intangible
184. Cf. Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 381 & n.235 (citing and quoting Nat’l Football
League Props., Inc. v. Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (“[T]he
buying public has come to associate the trademark with the sponsorship of the NFL or of the
particular member team involved.”)).
185. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 169, at 471–72 (“[T]he mark in these cases is
rarely serving the traditional function of a trademark. Rather than indicating something to the
consumer about the source . . . of a product, the mark is the product . . . .”). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently undercut the first sale doctrine by holding that the sale of
new products bearing an authorized VW or Audi chrome insignia to fans of the automakers
causes post-sale confusion and is an infringing use. See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1075–78 (9th Cir. 2006).
186. See Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 377–89 (documenting shift in quality control
standards as business practices changed and arguing that courts have de facto ended any
substantive quality control rules).
187. Cf. KOTLER, supra note 143, at 404 (“Perhaps the most distinctive skill of professional
marketers is their ability to create, maintain, protect, and enhance brands.”).
188. Methods of brand valuation continue to be debated but the fact remains that brands
account for some and a growing proportion of a company’s overall valuation. See LURY, supra
note 45, at 120 (examining the growth of the brand as an asset and how some British companies,
along with the London Stock Exchange, accept brand valuation while U.S. companies do not).
189. SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS
MARKET 47 (1989) (noting that in the 1920s, American Tobacco Company was claimed to have
had a total value of $227 million, with $45 million of that value coming from its trademarks,
and that National Biscuit Company’s Uneeda brand was worth an alleged $1 million, and Coca-
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assets—usually in the form of brand names—represent[ed] the larger
share” of a company’s overall value.190
The corporate dimension of the brand taxonomy offers a better way
to understand why trademark law embraced the idea of goodwill,
relaxed the goodwill assignment doctrine such that that rule is now
essentially meaningless and an exercise in “sterile formalism,”191 and
took such a permissive stance towards trademark licensing. Trademark
law continues to face business realities that see the brand as valuable in
and of itself and as a way to engage in a range of business activities.
The idea that a company will offer only one or perhaps a series of
related products is antiquated. Companies not only enter unrelated
product markets, but consumers have become inured to the idea that a
company may do so via brand extensions and mark licensing. In
addition, once the business world viewed the brand as a key, if not the
dominant, corporate asset, it is not surprising that the business world
would want the ability to trade that asset. Trademark law has stretched
the boundaries of the meaning of quality control and goodwill to
accommodate these practices. It has done so at the cost of fealty to the
consumer protection and search cost rationales of trademark doctrine.
C. Family or House Marks as Brand Extension
The recognition of family or house marks presents another example
of brand logic in trademark law. Trademark law explicitly claims that
marks for a company name or trade name alone—a mark that does not
identify a product—are not suitable for federal registration.192 Yet
trademark recognizes the idea of a house mark, such that SONY can
Cola alleged $5 million for its brand); accord Douglas A. Galbi, Communications Policy, Media
Development, and Convergence (Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission, 2001), available at http://www.galbithink.org/ media.htm.
190. MOOR, supra note 57, at 34; see also KOTLER, supra note 143, at 405 (explaining that
“brand equity” is often understood as “the price premium the brand commands times the extra
volume it moves over an average brand”); accord LURY, supra note 45, at 119–20. The value of
a brand is expressed when a company realizes a net worth greater than its tangible asset value.
For an extended investigation of the relationship between brand-equity and intangible assets, see
generally KLAUS JENNEWEIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF
TECHNOLOGY-BRANDS IN THE APPROPRIATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (2005)
(presenting a theory of how brand-equity and technology assets interact to allow companies to
extract value from initial technological investments).
191. See Calboli, supra note 161, at 832 (quoting 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 18:10)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
192. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 9:13 (“[A] term used only as a trade name is not
registerable. For example, a corporate name cannot be registered on the Principal Register
unless that name is also used in a trademark or service mark sense.”); accord id. § 3:2
(identifying a trademark’s functions as related to goods); David W. Barnes, One Trademark per
Source, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 3, 45 (2009).
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offer SONY WALKMAN and VAIO; APPLE can offer MACINTOSH
and IPOD; and MCDONALD’S can offer a host of “MC” foods such as
MCNUGGET, MCRIB, and MCFLURRY.193 Under trademark law, a
house mark “exists only if and when ‘the purchasing public recognizes
that the common characteristic is indicative of a common origin of the
goods.’”194 Furthermore, “a house mark serves as an umbrella for all of
the product marks and merchandise emanating from a single source.”195
Although the law’s formulation is couched in classic source
identification language, it fits better within a brand view of
trademarks.196
The move to an idea of an “umbrella” mark for all products adopts a
corporate brand view and acknowledge that companies wish to leverage
a company-level mark to support a range of business activities. As
discussed above, companies quickly learned to use an existing brand as
a way to sell new and possibly unrelated products.197 Product
diversification strategies within and into new product lines have
proliferated since the 1970s.198 In some cases, the strategy involves
using one mark across a range of related and unrelated products. The
VIRGIN GROUP uses its VIRGIN mark to offer VIRGIN
MEGASTORE—which sells “CDs, clothing, computer games, books,
beverages, and travel-related services”—beverages, an airline service, a
limousine service, and “rail services, balloon services, access to hotel
properties, bikes, cars, and mobile phones.”199 This example fits into the
identity approach to branding.
The identity approach to branding focuses the way in which a
company can build a monolithic company brand with one coherent,
centrally controlled identity to drive consumer purchases, rather than
focusing on single products. These behaviors fall under brand
diversification or extension strategies. Such strategies “try to satisfy
[consumers’] desire for ‘something different’ by providing a wide
variety of goods under a single brand umbrella. Such extensions,

193. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 7:5.
194. AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 814 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
195. In re Royal BodyCare, Inc., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564, 1568 (T.T.A.B. 2007).
196. Cf. Barnes, supra note 192, at 2 (arguing that trademark law ought to allow only one
trademark per source, rather than allowing companies to have a rack of trademarks because
“[m]ultiple marks are not necessary to indicate source”).
197. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; accord Katherine E. Halmen, The
Effects of the Corporate Diversification Trend on Trademarks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
459, 467 (2006).
198. See Halmen, supra note 197, at 467.
199. Id. at 468–70.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/5

40

Resai: From Trademarks to Brands

2012]

FROM TRADEMARKS TO BRANDS

1021

companies hope, fulfill customers’ desires while keeping them loyal to
the brand franchise.”200
Business literature argues that such extensions must be careful not
to harm the underlying brand and undercut the loyalty of existing
customers.201 But when properly executed, brand extensions allow
companies to rejuvenate some brands, bring in new customers for the
company overall, innovate with regard to product lines, block
competitors, and manage potential competitive threats from new
products.202 Thus, the house mark is the trademark term that maps to
brand extension strategy. Marketers know that the house mark is the
corporate brand, that it plays roles well beyond product identification,
and indeed is important without a product.
D. Trade Dress and Branded Packaging
When trademark law protects trade dress—“the total image of a
product [which] may include features such as size, shape, color or color
combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales
techniques”203—it protects a brand understanding of packaging and
marketing. From a business perspective, the package does not typically
fulfill a source identification function, but rather it fulfills other
company brand goals. From a “4 Ps” perspective, trade dress protection
addresses how companies seek to master the product, place, price, and
promotion aspects of marketing.
Trade dress protection originally related, however, to protection for
a product’s labeling.204 That protection came via unfair competition law,

200. John A. Quelch & David Kenny, Extend Profits, Not Product Lines, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept.–Oct. 1994, at 153, 154 (emphasis added).
201. John A. Quelch & David Kenny, John A. Quelch and David Kenny Respond:
“Extensions Must Be Carefully Planned and Monitored,” HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1994, at
60.
202. See David A. Aaker, Perspectives: The Logic of Brand Extensions, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Nov.–Dec. 1994, at 62.
203. John H. Harland Co. v. Clark Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983);
accord Graeme Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design
Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 471, 484 (1997) (noting the definition and its broad adoption);
Berzins, supra note 31, at 1664.
204. “Trade dress” traditionally includes the appearance of labels, wrappers, and containers
used in packaging a product as well as displays and other materials used in presenting the
product to prospective purchasers. The design features of the product itself are also sometimes
included within the meaning of “trade dress,” although the substantive rules applicable to the
protection of product designs differ in some respects from those applicable to packaging and
related subject matter. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (1995);
accord Dinwoodie, supra note 203, at 473; Smith, supra note 147, at 251 (2005) (“Historically,
trade dress law focused on packaging and labeling, and not the product itself.”).
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not early trademark law.205 Indeed, trade dress protection was probably
never intended to be part of the Lanham Act.206 Nonetheless, trade dress
began to creep into federal trademark law on par with other registrable
marks starting “in 1958 when then-Assistant Commissioner Daphne
Robert Leeds reinterpreted the Trademark Act to allow trade dress's
registration on the principal register.”207 Others trace the expansion of
trade dress protection to the 1970s when courts began recognizing and
protecting trade dress as unregistered marks.208 When Congress
amended the Lanham Act in 1988, courts already recognized trade dress
as a type of trademark, and the amendments explicitly acknowledged or
accepted that view by including a discussion of trade dress in the
statute.209 As such, for better or for worse, federal trademark law today
protects trade dress.210
To understand why trade dress protection may not be desirable,
recall that trademark law claims to be grounded on the idea that the
mark identifies source. Trade dress and source pose problems. Professor
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. explains that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition recognized that trade dress was rarely a source of
information about the product.211 Indeed, the common law “required
proof that consumers were relying on the claimed trade dress to identify
a product’s source” and strove to prevent “evidence that the plaintiff
had made a particular product feature, shape, or configuration popular”
from being conflated with demand for the product.212 Lunney explains:
With the recognition of trade dress as a trademark, this care
has largely disappeared. Accepting the pretense that trade
dress is a trademark, some courts have extended protection
to dress based upon popularity alone, without requiring any

205. See Smith, supra note 147, at 252.
206. See generally id.
207. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor’s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress
Does Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1133 (2000).
208. See Jessica Litman, Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress
Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 83 (1982); accord
Dinwoodie, supra note 203, at 478–79; Smith, supra note 147, at 253.
209. See Smith, supra note 147, at 253–54 (citing Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-167, 102 Stat. 3946 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) 2006)). But
see Lunney, supra note 207, at 1185–86 (questioning whether the 1998 amendments to the
Lanham Act ought to constitute reenactment of the Lanham Act that includes trade dress).
210. See John H. Harland Co. v. Clark Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983);
accord Dinwoodie, supra note 203, at 484 (noting the definition and its broad adoption);
Berzins, supra note 31, at 1664.
211. Lunney, supra note 207, at 1164.
212. Id.
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proof that consumers were relying on the claimed dress to
identify the product’s source.213
In short, trade dress often may not serve a source identifying function. If
trademark law is supposed to protect source identifying functions, why
does it open the door to protection outside that realm? Lunney’s
analysis of trade dress points to brands.
The history of trade dress practices as brand practices tracks the
law’s growing acceptance of trade dress as a trademark. Companies
have used labels and packages to build brands since the beginning of
mass markets.214 Packaging provided product information and
simultaneously served a company’s larger brand project. Companies
used better labeling and packaging techniques to communicate with
consumers, but that communication often included or focused on using
values to encourage buying one company’s product over a competitor’s
for reasons other than price or quality of the good.215 Commercial
images and standardized packaging—trade dress—allowed for greater
control over price and distribution, but it also created a sense of
nationhood and belonging.216
For example, in the early 1900s, companies used trade dress to offer
newly urban dwellers from rural areas and abroad a sense of connection
to each other via the branded product.217 Recently, that message has
been inverted, and the brand has become a way to connect isolated
suburbanites to each other.218 In either case, the branded product,
including the packaging, did more than offer product information; it
offered a “total image” that the company wished to convey via its brand.
As Lunney might say, companies’ packages had popularity beyond the
products.
Furthermore, whenever companies compete over selling essentially
the same goods, and therefore must manage excess production capacity,

213. Id.
214. See KLEIN, supra note 127, at 197; LURY, supra note 45, at 18–19; MOOR, supra note
57, at 18 (“[I]nnovations in production, printing and packaging made the mass branding of
goods possible.”); accord Bone, supra note 8, at 577.
215. See MOOR, supra note 57, at 18–20; cf. Joachimsthaler & Aaker, supra note 77, at 39
(“[M]ass-media advertising has long been the cornerstone of most brand-building efforts.”).
216. See MOOR, supra note 57, at 20.
217. See id. at 21 (explaining that national goods became “the most familiar and stable
features of a strange and new environment and, in some cases, the only bond between people
who were otherwise culturally heterogeneous”).
218. See Holt, supra note 122, at 82 (explaining that the same stabilizing effect occurred as
Americans moved from cities to suburbia where they knew no one and looked to brands as
social anchors).
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marketing becomes a larger concern.219 Product design became a key
factor in developing and marketing a good because of the need to
distinguish goods that were quite similar but for their packaging. 220 By
the 1960s and 1970s this new emphasis on design became connected to
the larger aim of creating a brand that projected a singular corporate
identity—one that integrated design coordination and a more scientific
approach to marketing.221 It is perhaps not coincidental that the two
moments legal scholarship identifies as most important in the growth of
trade dress protection—1958 when trade dress could be registered on
the principal register and the 1970s when trade dress began to be
protected as an unregistered mark—map to the business practices of
those times.
Recent major trade dress cases can also be understood as addressing
the business realities of competing over essentially interchangeable
goods and using packing and design to overcome that problem. For
example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc.222 involved a dispute between two Mexican restaurants
and their respective presentation of the indoor and outdoor dining
areas.223 The Court’s decision in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co.224 involved a dispute over the use of a specific shade of green on
dry cleaning presses.225 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,226 the
Court addressed a conflict between clothing manufacturers about the
design of seersucker infant clothing with appliqués.227
Although these cases are mainly understood as delineating the
requirements for protection of specific types of trade dress,228 the
underlying question is not whether trade dress—be it product packaging
or product design—can be protected, but rather under what

219. See HOLT, supra note 56, at 225 (explaining that the basics of competition are a
given); KLEIN, supra note 127, at 197; MOOR, supra note 57, at 26–27.
220. DANESI, supra note 37, at 60–67 (detailing the importance of product and package
design through the examples of the automobile, perfume, and tobacco industries); MOOR, supra
note 57, at 26–27.
221. See LURY, supra note 45, at 20–22; MOOR, supra note 57, at 30–31; cf. Moore & Reid,
supra note 24, at 3 (noting that branding has been a topic in marketing studies prior to the 1970s
but was only “a major topic of study” from 1970 forward).
222. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
223. Id. at 765.
224. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
225. Id. at 161.
226. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
227. Id. at 207.
228. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 147, at 265–75 (analyzing the three cases and the Supreme
Court’s different approaches to the question of which trade dress type can be inherently
distinctive and which type requires proof of secondary meaning).
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circumstances it should be protected.229 From a brand perspective, the
common thread in these cases is that companies compete in markets
where each company offers essentially the same goods and seeks to use
trade dress to maintain its position in that type of market. As brand
scholarship puts it, “the lack of obvious differences between products
made good appearance a ‘necessity.’”230 Trademark law has been more
than happy to protect this brand interest.
E. Initial Interest and Post-Sale Confusion as Control of Brand Identity
As source or information issues, initial interest confusion and postsale confusion lack justification. But once one takes a corporate brand
perspective they make sense.231 The initial interest confusion doctrine
tries to prevent the following situation: A consumer is drawn to a
provider of goods or services because of a name or logo; the consumer
arrives at the provider’s place of business and quickly realizes that this
provider is not the one the consumer was seeking; the provider,
however, offers the same or almost the same goods, and the consumer
decides that it is best to close the deal with the provider. In such a
scenario, the consumer is not confused by the time she purchases the
good, and the doctrine has little to do with rational choice problems that
traditionally animate trademark law.232
Instead, the doctrine prevents one from diverting potential
customers’ attention and protects the inchoate idea of goodwill.233 By

229. See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 203, at 475 (“The expansion of Lanham Act
coverage to include product design has severely stretched the capacity of the existing concept of
distinctiveness to determine the appropriate boundaries of protectable subject matter.”).
230. DANESI, supra note 37, at 60–67 (detailing the importance of product and package
design through the examples of the automobile, perfume, and tobacco industries); MOOR, supra
note 57, at 26–27 (citing HAROLD LIVINGSTON VAN DOREN, INDUSTRIAL DESIGN: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 13 (1940)). Beebe explains that we may be living in a “Diamond Age” where the
increasing ability persuasively to imitate relative goods (though without
necessarily imitating their absolute utility) anticipates what social role
intellectual property law might play in such an environment. For what the
mimetic technologies discussed above ultimately predict is a kind of post-rarity
world, perhaps one in which certain material forms of absolute utility remain
scarce, but persuasive copies of material forms of relative utility become
superabundant.
Beebe, supra note 31, at 834–36.
231. See Austin, supra note 33, at 853, 896–98, 902–04.
232. See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005).
233. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062
(9th Cir. 1999) (“[B]y using ‘moviebuff.com’ or ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking for
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protecting the reputation and drawing power of a mark, courts enhance
a company’s ability to pursue a brand strategy that seeks to move
beyond single-sale, utilitarian relationships to an ongoing one where the
consumer seeks out the company brand repeatedly regardless of
product, place, price, or promotion. As one commentator points out, this
doctrine disfavors comparative advertising, reduces competition, and
impinges on speech even by a noncompetitor,234 all of which aid
corporate brand goals while diminishing the noncorporate brand
interests.
Post-sale confusion protects brands more openly and provides
another example in which the consumer is not confused and search costs
are not at stake. In post-sale confusion cases, the consumer knows that
she bought a knock-off Gucci bag or Rolex watch. The doctrine in part
holds that the harm lies in others aside from the consumer possibly
being fooled into thinking that the item was genuine; thus, the doctrine
attempts to protect the prestige of the mark.235 This aspect of the
doctrine explicitly looks to protecting the status dimensions of a mark.
In a touchstone case regarding the issue of allowing individuals to make
and sell facsimiles of an original work, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit explained that the problem lay in allowing someone
to make the facsimile of the original and sell it so that the consumer
could “acquir[e] the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at
the customers’ homes would regard as a prestigious article.”236 Other
iterations of the doctrine reveal deeper brand protections. When courts
hold that the doctrine seeks to prevent the impression that an item is no
longer scarce, they are protecting a business world that turned to
branding precisely because of a marketplace where the goods
themselves were not distinct but instead overabundant.237 Companies
use brands as levers to allow the creation of distinction and scarcity
where none was present. Post-sale confusion goes directly to that
interest, as well.238

‘MovieBuff’ to its web site, West Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield
developed in its mark.”); accord Rothman, supra note 232, at 121 (discussing Brookfield).
234. See Rothman, supra note 232, at 130–59.
235. See Lunney, supra note 144, at 404–08.
236. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches,
Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955).
237. See Beebe, supra note 31, at 851–55 (tracing various forms of the doctrine as
protecting status and consumption behaviors rather than confusion over source).
238. See Austin, supra note 33, at 902 (“The value that consumers accord to prestige
brands is enormously important to firms, as it enables them to charge premium prices for goods
well above their marginal cost. The post-sale impression of goods may be critical to a brand’s
success.” (footnote omitted)).
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F. Dilution: Open Protection for Brands
The dilution doctrine may be the clearest example of how trademark
law is well-explained from a corporate brand perspective. The essence
of a dilution claim is that holders of famous marks can sue junior users
“regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury.”239 Dilution law is thus not
concerned with consumers’ search costs. Instead, it is rooted in
Schechter’s argument that trademark law should protect “the creation
and retention of custom, rather than the designation of
source . . . and . . . the preservation of the uniqueness or individuality of
the trademark [because that] is of paramount importance to its
owner.”240 Furthermore, “dilution law is producer-focused rather than
consumer-focused: It seeks to prevent diminution in the value of a
famous mark stemming from the use of the mark by someone other than
the trademark [h]older.”241
From its inception, the doctrine has been subject to intense scrutiny
in legal academia.242 Professor Clarissa Long captures the range of
criticisms by legal scholars:
Ever since the creation of federal dilution law, legal
commentators have expressed consternation about this
variation of the trademark entitlement. Dilution law has
been called “absolute and unlimitable,” “powerful,” and
“immensely popular.” Commentators have labeled dilution
law “a fundamental shift in the nature of trademark
protection,” concluded that “plaintiffs frequently win” their
dilution claims, and wondered whether the statute will
prove to be a “disaster.” Some commentators are concerned
that dilution law represents an expansion in property rights
at the expense of the public domain. Others worry that it
stifles expression, hampers commercial communication, or
239. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). Federal dilution law has been revised since its initial
passage in 1995. The original federal statute for dilution simply stated that the holder of a
famous mark may bring a claim for dilution, but could only obtain an injunction against the
junior user of the mark if that use “causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.” 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1995). Under the revised federal statute a claim may still only be brought
by the holder of a famous mark, but now the junior user’s use must be “likely to cause dilution
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark” for there to be a remedy under the
cause of action. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
240. SCHECHTER, supra note 23, at 822 (emphasis omitted).
241. Clarissa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2006); accord Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (noting that dilution law is aimed at protecting
producers not consumers).
242. See, e.g., Long, supra note 241, at 1029–30; Nelson, supra note 52, at 732.
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reduces competition. Richard Posner frets about dilution’s
“seductive appeal.”243
From a traditional search cost and information view, these criticisms
have much force.244 They also assume that trademark law is in fact
driven by these normative lodestars.
The reality is that dilution law abandons these foundations, and
trademark law in general has been engaged with concerns well beyond
search costs and information for decades. When Congress explained the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act as protecting “the substantial
investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value
and aura of the mark itself,”245 it implicitly took a corporate brand view
of trademarks.246 Providing legal recourse based on a company’s
“investment in the mark” and its construction of a mark’s “aura” fits
directly into the way the corporate dimension of brands operates.
Such perspectives acknowledge that companies seek to construct a
mark with an identity and personality—traits that offer much more than
information to the consumer. Criticisms that dilution is far removed
from trademark law’s search cost and consumer-focused foundations
are accurate, but they miss the point that trademark law has already
imported a corporate brand perspective into its doctrine. Dilution can be
seen as merely the most obvious iteration of that view.

243. Long, supra note 241, at 1030 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Beebe, supra note 11, at
684; Gerard N. Magliocca, From Ashes to Fire: Trademark and Copyright in Transition, 82
N.C. L. REV. 1009, 1033 (2004); David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law
in the New Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659, 1681 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, The
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999); David
J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider
Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 118 (2004); Wendy J. Gordon,
Introduction, Symposium, Ralph Sharp Brown, Intellectual Property, and the Public Interest,
108 YALE L.J. 1611, 1614–15 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 621, 623 (2003)).
244. But see Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence
from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 449 (2008) (showing that the revised law also seems to add little power to
trademark enforcement); Long, supra note 241, at 1031 (arguing that doctrine has added little to
enforcement power of trademark holders); Lunney, supra note 144, at 408–10 (“[Dilution] was
often tacked onto the court’s opinion as little more than an afterthought.”); see also LURY, supra
note 45, at 109 (noting the growth of dilution doctrine in the United Kingdom and the shift from
confusion to more expansive protection against all uses of a mark).
245. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
246. But see Lunney, supra note 144, at 475–76 (arguing that the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 imported source confusion and “does not reflect a purely property-based
view of trademarks”).
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III. BRAND FAILURES IN TRADEMARK LAW
At its core, trademark law only has room for source confusion.
Although trademark law purports to be consumer-focused and
protecting, the concept of the consumer in trademark law is inconsistent
and incomplete. Questions about whether someone uses a mark in ways
beyond source confusion are quickly forced back into analyses that do
not capture how the mark functions for the consumer. In other words,
trademark law fails to accommodate the consumer dimension of a
brand. The way the law addresses the possibility of community marks
further illustrates these problems and provides an opportunity to see the
shortcomings of the likelihood of confusion test, which is the
touchstone test for determining trademark infringement.
A. Trademark Law’s Erroneous View of Consumers and Communities
Trademark law’s view of the consumer is paradoxical if not
disingenuous. Mired in the world of the fully rational consumer,
trademark law claims that trademarks are information resources for the
consumer to use as part of the purchasing process. Whether this rational
creature exists is questionable, and empirical work to support the view
is missing.247 Regardless, when it comes to issues of infringement and
protecting the consumer, this highly rational consumer morphs into a
dullard who must not be asked to use any extra thought to discern what
a mark may signify.248
As Professor Graeme W. Austin offers, “[T]rademark law often
seems to be premised on the idea that consumers are mesmerized by
brands and are incapable of very much independent thought. . . . The
law assumes that the ordinarily prudent consumer unthinkingly accepts
the messages trademark proprietors seek to enforce through their
branding strategies.”249 In other words, when the law abandons the
rational consumer model, it inserts a view that is not only suspect but
rejects what brand literature acknowledges: consumers are rather savvy
247. Austin, supra note 33, at 866–71 (examining trademark law’s “inchoate empiricism”);
Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2022–25
(2005) (identifying the law’s idealized view of the consumer as “impossibly utilitarian” and the
debate around the capacities of consumers to think for themselves).
248. Austin, supra note 33, at 887–88 (“Some strands of case law, particularly from the
early decades of the twentieth century, emphasized that ‘the public must be credited with a
minimum capacity for discrimination.’ More recently, however, ordinarily prudent consumers
have also been characterized as ‘credulous,’ ‘inexperienced,’ and ‘gullible.’” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir. 1935),
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:93 (4th
ed. 1996), and Stork Rest., Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948))); Beebe, supra note
247, at 2023–24.
249. Austin, supra note 33, at 829 (footnote omitted).
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about brands, to the point where they take brands and imbue them with
personal meanings. Insofar as the law adheres to a behavioral model, in
which the company pushes the psychological buttons of the consumer
who is shaped by the message and helpless to resist that message, the
law adheres to a view that business practice has questioned and in some
cases rejected this model, as the full ownership of the consumer is
discredited in consumer brand theory.250 This view still suggests,
however, that trademark law sees its role as understanding and
protecting consumers.
Ironically, trademark law’s role has been to use consumers as a
lever in prying trademark law away from consumer protection towards
brand protection. Professor Barton Beebe’s work provides insight about
how two such contradictory views of the consumer—highly rational or
inane—fed this shift and points to brands as I have described them. In a
trademark lawsuit, one will characterize consumers depending on
whether one wants a broad or narrow scope of trademark protection. On
the one hand, a sophisticated, informed consumer is less likely to be
confused and so the scope of protection for the trademark would be
commensurately less. One is not confused when one can discern
between two marks. On the other hand, an unsophisticated, less
informed consumer militates in favor of greater trademark protection.251
But as Beebe explains, these extremes miss an important aspect of
trademarks: their power to persuade. When one follows Beebe’s lead
and parses trademarks as having the capacity for raising or lowering
search or information costs as well as the capacity for persuading
consumers to buy a good, one enters a world of brands.
According to Beebe, mark holders choose to “assume the costs of
search in order to gain the benefits of persuasion.”252 That is, producers
will invest in reducing consumers’ search costs by increasing the
distinctiveness of their marks as compared to others by “bring[ing] ever
more information to the marketplace, inside of which is persuasion.”253
Persuasion is not, however, about utility information such as price or
function; rather it is about creating a mark that offers differentiation and
distinction such that a consumer will buy the marked good for the sake
of the mark.254
This shift to protecting producer’s persuasion interest explains why
Austin can assert that “important aspects of trademark doctrine render
consumer thought largely irrelevant to liability theories” and that “[i]n
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See supra Part I.B.1.
Beebe, supra note 247, at 2035, 2038.
Id. at 2066.
Id. at 2068.
Id. at 2044.
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much trademark law, legally cognizable harm equates with damage that
rival traders might do to the ‘branded’ consumer worldview.”255
Trademark law feeds brand protection, not consumer protection. As
Beebe explains, “The consumer, once sovereign, has been deposed,
deprivileged, decentered.”256 In the consumer’s place is a system that
looks to marks as marks, and its “goal . . . is to enhance the power of the
[brand] system.”257
The fair use doctrine in trademark law provides another perspective
on trademark law’s inability to handle the consumer dimension of
brands. In the abstract, expressive use of a trademark is not actionable
by the trademark holder. Yet what is an expressive use of a mark and
what constitutes fair use is an unclear and unstable area of trademark
law.258 Furthermore, although some trademark theory has tried to
explain that marks serve multiple roles and are rarely purely sourceidentifying,259 the dominant view of trademark law as being a private
good260 fully under the control of the mark holder has led to dubious
litigation tactics by mark holders.261 Individual uses of marks—such as
Barbie in artistic contexts,262 Lego on fan sites,263 and in almost any

255. Austin, supra note 33, at 829.
256. Beebe, supra note 247, at 2072.
257. Id.
258. See generally William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV.
49 (2008) (arguing that should a case reach a court free speech concerns usually prevent the
plaintiff from recovery but that ambiguous trademark “fair use” doctrines generate litigation and
chill speech).
259. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 11, at 625; Desai & Rierson, supra note 134, at 1802–03;
Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1340
(1980); Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1605–06 (2010).
260. See David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 22, 23–24, 50–57 (2006), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol5/
iss1/2 (exploring the tension between private and public goods conceptions of trademark).
261. K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion
Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 612–14 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1064 (2005).
262. In artistic contexts, expressive uses entail incorporating a trademark into a painting,
sculpture, etc. These uses fall under a different yet related issue of the incorporation of a
trademark into art, and focus on whether a given use is protected under First Amendment
principles. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003)
(artistic works incorporating and transforming Mattel’s Barbie doll constituted parodic speech
protected by the First Amendment).
263. See, e.g., Desai & Rierson, supra note 134, at 1840–41 (describing the Lego
Corporation’s response to the www.ratemylego.com fan site).
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non-commercial context—are supposed to be permitted but have been
suppressed by aggressive mark enforcement.264
As a result, those who wish to use a mark with a good degree of
certainty face great uncertainty regarding whether a given use is
permitted.265 And if one is sued, the precise nature of which uses are at
issue and actionable varies from case to case, circuit to circuit, and one
part of trademark law to another.266 Furthermore, by focusing on free
speech and expressive uses, the law becomes entangled in questions of
what qualifies as speech and what speech is protected. This approach
also lacks space for what brand management literature acknowledges
and exploits: people use brands in ways that are beyond source
identification and beyond legal conceptions of speech. At the individual
level, brands become part of how someone creates who they are and
represents that self to the world.
Community dimensions of brands fare no better under trademark
law than consumer dimensions and are possibly in worse shape.267 By
their nature, community brand situations involve a group of consumer
enthusiasts who take it upon themselves to define the brand.268 This
group may engage in one or more activities, including building Web
sites, holding meetings, writing polemics, creating artwork, and
producing branded merchandise.269 The mark in question will be
prominently displayed, discussed, and distributed. In many cases the
mark will appear as or near how it was originally displayed precisely
because of the power of that context. Trademark law, however, asks
whether these acts are likely to cause confusion, and the nature of the
test for that question does not provide room for this sort of community
action.270
264. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL
CULTURE (2005) (detailing numerous over-enforcement actions by trademark holders who seek
to trademark and control “public life”).
265. See McGeveran, supra note 258, at 61–64, 66–68; cf. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A.
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 285–87 (2007) (noting that even the structure of
copyright law, which allows for non-rightholder uses, poses difficulties in determining what
uses are permitted).
266. For an excellent analysis of the ways in which expressive use is supposed to work
compared to how it operates in practice, see generally McGeveran, supra note 258.
267. The term “community” as used in this Article should not be taken as an interpretation
or application of the European Community Trade Mark, which allows one to secure “trademark
rights throughout the European Union.” Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory:
Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 946 (2004) (citing
Council Regulation No. 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 3 (EC)).
268. See supra Part I.B.2.
269. See supra Part I.B.2.
270. See McGeveran, supra note 258, at 66, 69 (noting the structural problems inherent in
the test).
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Likelihood of confusion is a multifactor test. Courts examine a set
of factors that vary from circuit to circuit to determine whether a
particular way a non-mark holder offers the mark is likely to cause
confusion.271 The test seems simple enough, but a short analysis of how
each factor would be read for community brands shows the test’s
inadequacy for community brands.272
Assume that a community brand group has formed for NIKE. The
group has a Web site, holds meetings, attends Nike-sponsored events,
and produces T-shirts for members of the group. The community’s use
of NIKE involves a strong mark—a mark that consumers know and
identify with Nike, the company.273 That fact weighs against allowing
the community mark’s continued use. Given that communities engage
with a brand by copying them exactly or by offering a close
interpretation of a brand, courts will easily find that a community
mark’s version of the mark is similar to the corporation’s mark. That
similarity is often the point of the community brand. Another factor is
proximity of goods. The community group offers merchandise to
celebrate the community’s connection to the brand. The merchandise
will likely have the NIKE SWOOSH on the shirt. It may or may not
271. Cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1600 (2006) (demonstrating that the variances across
circuits is broad and that courts often rely on a few, select factors and then “stampede” the other
factors to reach desired results). See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, §§ 24:29–:43
(listing the multifactor test across all circuit courts).
272. Despite the differences across circuits, for simplicity’s sake and to emulate analysis
from a circuit that has a large number of trademark cases, I use the Ninth Circuit’s formulation
of the test here. The factors examined include (1) the “strength of the mark;” (2) “proximity [or
relatedness] of the goods;” (3) the “similarity of the marks;” (4) “evidence of actual confusion;”
(5) the “marketing channels used;” (6) the degree of care customers are likely to exercise in
purchasing the goods; (7) the “defendant’s intent in selecting the mark;” and (8) “the likelihood
of expansion” into other markets. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir.
1979). Note that Beebe’s study shows that “the similarity of the marks, the proximity of the
goods, evidence of actual confusion, and the strength of the plaintiff’s mark” are common to all
the circuits and that intent is common to all except the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. See Beebe, supra note 271, at 1589–90.
273. Strength of mark is a nuanced aspect of trademark law. As McCarthy explains,
[T]he more distinctive, unique and well-known the mark, the deeper is the
impression it creates upon the public’s consciousness and the greater the scope
of protection to which it is entitled. The legal strength of a mark is usually the
same as its economic and marketing strength. A term which has achieved
widespread customer recognition as a symbol of origin is more likely to result
in confusion because of a junior user’s similar mark on similar goods than a
mark that few customers know of or recognize.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 11:73 (footnotes omitted). Of course, one might argue that if a
mark is strong enough, consumers may not be confused at all.
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have the group’s name on it. A loyal group may imitate a NIKE shirt
such as the famous Jordan soaring silhouette but tweak the company
version by adding something that indicates the group’s interpretation of
the brand. Some may go so far as to create Nike zombies or oddball
merchandise, such as a pillow in the shape of the Air Jordan shoe.274 If
Nike sells merchandise at fairs or fan meetings, and the community
does so as well, a court may find that the goods are in close proximity.
Evidence of actual confusion is considered the best evidence of
likelihood of confusion,275 but that assumption leaves little room for
community uses of the mark. A few examples of actual confusion, such
as less than ten emails or shoppers claiming actual confusion, will
suffice.276 Courts have found evidence of actual confusion to be highly
persuasive and tend to prevent such further use.277 In our example, the
community group tries to stay true to its view of the core NIKE image.
In theory, a mainstream user could encounter the community group
brand and think that it was really from Nike. The very nature of the
community group’s approach and the low threshold for what constitutes
the best evidence of the likelihood of confusion combine so that in
almost all cases, the community brand will be deemed to cause actual
confusion. But that conclusion misapprehends the point of the
community brand. Community brands take the view that the
community, rather than the corporation, may be or is the true custodian
of the brand’s reputation. Community brand groups often claim to be
official purveyors of the brand’s history and meaning.278 As such, a
community group can often be quite precise about how the company
presents its brand imagery and message while still questioning and
deviating from a company’s latest idea of what the brand is.279
Asking whether marketing channels are likely to converge is also
the wrong question. Insofar as the community group is selling some
merchandise at NIKE-themed events or online, a court could find this
factor increases the likelihood of confusion. But the community group is
not really marketing its goods to compete with the corporation. As
noted under the actual confusion factor, the community group is a bit
different than other consumers. Courts tend to assume that relatively
274. See Nike Air Jordan 1 Sneaker Pillow, ETSY, http://www.etsy.com/listing/
88144144/nike-air-jordan-1-sneaker-pillow. I thank Professor Justin Hughes for asking about
brand practices that are closer to practices found in fan-fiction.
275. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 23:13.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 56, at 155–56, 184–87 (describing Harley-Davidson
community activists); Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427 (detailing SAAB community
behaviors).
279. See HOLT, supra note 56, at 155–56, 184–87.
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common goods are bought without much care.280 A court could find that
most consumers will not exercise much care as they purchase workout
shirts or posters or visit Web sites about a company.281 The brand
community, however, is not confused about the nature of the
merchandise. Given the devotion of a brand community, the community
would instead be quite aware of the differences among the offerings.
Examining a defendant’s intent is another misplaced inquiry when
considering community marks. Discerning intent is difficult and
requires a fact inquiry.282 Nonetheless, courts often infer intent to
infringe from the mere presence of a brand or ask whether the defendant
took steps to dispel confusion.283 This distinction presents an ambiguity
that would cut against community groups, as they might indicate they
are not part of Nike the company, but proclaim they are the true keeper
of the NIKE brand. A Nike community group would intend that it has
an “affiliation, connection, or association” with NIKE the brand, but the
group would not necessarily intend that Nike was “the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of [the group’s] goods, services, or
commercial activities.”284
Finally, although a community group may sell merchandise, it is not
really in the market that the corporation is in. Nonetheless, the group
may be seen to be in a market which the company may enter, and the
market entry factor would weigh against the community group. In our
example, Nike may want to expand into the fan sector. Indeed, given the
company’s brand goal of creating a loyal, fan-based brand, such a move
may be likely. The community group’s presence could be seen as either
280. Cf. Virgin Enters. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that
professional buyers have a higher standard of care than common retail consumers).
281. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 23:93 (“The law is not made for the protection of
experts, but for the public—that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and
the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by
appearance and general impressions.” (quoting Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 F.
73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
282. McGeveran, supra note 258, at 96–97. In theory, one could intend to confuse, fail to
do so, and arguably not be liable for infringement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 22 cmt. b (1995) (“[P]roof of an intent to deceive is not required . . . .”). But cf.
Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737,
754–55 (2007) (suggesting that trademark law departs from other legal speech restrictions in its
lack-of-intent-requirements).
283. McGeveran, supra note 258, at 96 (“Not surprisingly, courts often deny summary
judgment for defendants because questions of fact remain concerning this vague and possibly
intent-based third factor. For example, the Ninth Circuit has found the mere presence of a
celebrity’s likeness or trademark created enough possibility of implied endorsement to foreclose
summary judgment.” (footnote omitted) (citing Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d
994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001), and Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412–13 (9th
Cir. 1996))).
284. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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impeding the company’s ability to do so or somehow as competing with
the company for the fan support market. Neither of these views reflects
what a community group does with merchandise.
Perhaps most damning is that the above analysis affords courts the
presumption that they weight each factor equally in applying the test.
Empirical work by Beebe shows, however, that is not the case.285
Instead, it appears that if courts find intent and actual confusion, they
are likely to “stampede” the rest of the analysis to conform to the
outcome, especially when that outcome favors finding confusion.286
Given the way in which communities use marks, the chance is high that
a court would find that such uses cause actual confusion and were
animated by an intent to infringe the mark. These two conclusions
would lead to a finding of infringement regardless of the propriety of
such a ruling. Even if one dismisses Beebe’s findings, for almost any
brand, the design of the likelihood of confusion test does not
accommodate the community brand perspective.287 Instead, each factor
champions a one-way, corporate control model of trademarks. Any
slightly ambiguous aspect of the analysis tilts in favor of the mark
holder. Much like individuals and consumer marks, groups who use
community brands do not fit well into trademarks law’s view of how
trademarks function.
B. Brands as Information Resources that Enable the Co-Creation of Value
The search cost theory of trademarks not only has run amok, it no
longer maps to the way in which information and value creation
interact. As a normative matter, a brand theory of trademark embraces
the shift to a co-creation of value model. In addition, it reorients and
revives the role of trademarks as true information resources, not simply
one-way tools controlled by corporations.
Trademark law in essence invokes consumers as it vaunts producer
interests. Even if one concedes that trademark law’s formula for
protecting consumer interests is viable as an abstract matter, one must
address a problem. As Professor Douglas A. Kysar explains, because
consumers are “express[ing] public values through a market medium
that is being endorsed simultaneously as a primary locus of choice,
opportunity, and responsibility, individuals may well come to view such
preferences as their most appropriate mechanism for influencing the

285. See Beebe, supra note 271, at 1620.
286. Id. at 1614–15.
287. Cf. McGeveran, supra note 258, at 76 (“[M]arching one-by-one through the ill-fitting
factors of the likelihood of confusion test is a terrible methodology for resolving expressive use
cases.”).
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policies and conditions of a globalized world.”288 This dynamic raises a
vital issue: “[I]f private market behavior is to serve the expansive
evaluative function that proponents of the liberal market vision have
proposed for it, then consumers should receive an informational context
that is appropriately robust for the role they are being asked to serve.”289
Trademarks arguably provide some of the required information, but
they are not “appropriately robust.” Trademark law’s current structure
vindicates the corporate control aspects of information flow and often
serves as a tool to squash the noncorporate aspects. A brand theoretical
approach to trademarks, however, moves beyond tenuous reliance on
producers to care for consumers’ interests. It provides a way to ensure
that all sides of the market, consumers and producers, receive an
“appropriately robust” “informational context.”290
Corporations, consumers, and communities all play large roles in
providing information about a brand.291 Corporations use radio,
television, and the Internet to offer brand information. At the same time,
using sophisticated, yet practically ubiquitous, information tools,
activists have platforms from which they can both question and laud a
company’s business practices. Brand activists put corporate practices
related to brand image and identity—such as labor, sustainability, the
environment, health, and more—front and center, and in ways not
previously possible.292 This information is obviously useful to
consumers and communities who wish to make better-informed
purchasing decisions.293 What is perhaps less obvious is that both

288. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 535 (2004).
289. Id.
290. See id.; cf. Litman, supra note 9, at 1731–32 (noting how protecting the persuasive
aspects of trademarks hinders competition and the differences in information offered as
purchasers decide what to buy).
291. One commentator argues that it is precisely the most ardent of consumers to whom a
company must pay attention, for so-called super-consumers, who are about 10% of a market,
can account for 50% of profits. See Eddie Yoon, Tap into Your Super-Consumers, HARV. BUS.
REV. BLOG (Nov. 25, 2009, 8:39 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2009/11/surprising_insights
_from_super.html.
292. See Kysar, supra note 288, at 529, 641 (“Globalization . . . has enhanced the flow of
information, not merely goods, and information regarding processes increasingly is finding its
way downstream[, and c]onsumers are responding accordingly[:] . . . consumer preferences may
be heavily influenced by information regarding the manner in which goods are produced.”); cf.
Isabelle Maignan & O.C. Ferrell, Corporate Social Responsibility and Marketing: An
Integrative Framework, 32 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 3, 6–7 (2004).
293. See generally Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311 (2009)
(decoding trademarks and certification marks in order to enable consumers to make sound
purchasing decisions); Kysar, supra note 288, at 527–29 (distinguishing between productrelated information as it applies to potential hazards to users versus actual hazards to workers,
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positive and negative information is not only useful, but vital to
companies who wish to remain competitive.
Although a company taking the corporate control view of brands
and trademarks may not like the way in which consumers and
communities interact with and interpret a brand, brand theorists have
shown that a company can and should use noncorporate-driven
information and images of the brand to inform and shape brand strategy.
Holt’s study of brands argues that brands—such as COCA-COLA,
CORONA, SNAPPLE, MOUNTAIN DEW, VW BEETLE, and
BUDWEISER—thrive when they pay attention to the noncorporate
dimensions of brands and “co-author” the brand with consumers and
communities.294
For example, a case study of the HARLEY-DAVIDSON brand
shows how companies can use noncorporate market information to
enhance the brand. Despite being the only American motorcycle
company after its last domestic rival, Indian, closed in 1953, HarleyDavidson began losing ground in the 1960s as Japanese competitors
entered the market.295 At that time, management opposed the way in
which consumers viewed the HARLEY-DAVIDSON brand. HarleyDavidson rejected the myth—outlaw freedom—that its brand offered
because it saw that image as antithetical to the suburban touring vehicle
Harley-Davidson wanted its bikes to be.296 In the 1980s, HarleyDavidson operated from a corporate control perspective and took over
the independently organized customer groups, as they seemed like a
great marketing tool. That move upset Harley-Davidson’s core brand
community.297
Despite these missteps, the culture industry and populist views of
HARLEY-DAVIDSON generated a brand image that Harley-Davidson,
the company, was able to tap into when it changed its attitude toward
the outlaw image and those who embraced that view. The initial
attempts to ape the way in which the culture saw HARLEYDAVIDSON rang false. But as Harley-Davidson became more
sophisticated in listening to consumers and communities, its marketing
people were able to draw on the core image and author additional brand
stories and related images that resonated with the views its loyal
customers had about Harley-Davidson and the world.298 As Holt argues,
animals, and the environment due to the production of such goods, and how such affect
consumer purchasing decisions).
294. HOLT, supra note 56, passim.
295. Id. at 155–56.
296. Id. at 186–87.
297. Id. at 184.
298. Id. at 187.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/5

58

Resai: From Trademarks to Brands

2012]

FROM TRADEMARKS TO BRANDS

1039

although HARLEY-DAVIDSON addressed some quality issues and
spent money on advertising, the consumers, the Harley-Davidson
community, and the culture provided the information required to turn
Harley-Davidson around and offer a brand that produced long waiting
lists for motorcycles, which cost $20,000 and often led to spending
another $5,000 on Harley-Davidson accessories.299
Mattel’s about-face regarding Aqua’s song “Barbie Girl” provides
another example of how an initial negative reaction among consumers
can change to acceptance of an alternative review of the brand. Aqua’s
song mocked BARBIE and much of the negative stereotypes for which
BARBIE seemed to stand, such as leading a plastic life, being a blonde
bimbo, and embodying the idea that women are objects to be dressed up
and manipulated. Mattel sued the record publisher on several grounds,
including a claim that the song violated trademark law. Mattel lost the
case in 2002.300 By the end of 2009, however, Mattel licensed “Barbie
Girl,” altered some of the risqué and more critical lyrics, and created the
doll’s first music video to go with the song.301
One could plausibly argue that Harley-Davidson, and those who
follow the lead of consumers and communities, merely co-opt true
populist culture. Some antibrand activists argue just that point. Yet
asking whether corporate responses to consumer and community views
are attempts to co-opt culture is the wrong question. Before
understanding why it is the wrong question, it is necessary to appreciate
the effects of brand criticism.
As discussed above, antibrand movements use brands as a resource
to express displeasure with a brand and its affiliated corporation. Klein
documents how Nike, McDonald’s, and Shell faced activists who
challenged the brands for not living up to standards or failing to meet
desired standards.302 The Nike activists used the Internet, the press,
protests, and community events to provide high-quality information
regarding Nike labor practices and the way in which inner city
markets—a key culture center used in marketing Nike products—were
driven to pay extremely marked-up prices (in some cases, teens even
killed one another) to acquire the products.303
299. Id. at 156.
300. See generally Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc, 296 F.3d 894, 899, 908 (9th Cir.
2002).
301. See Stuart Elliot, Years Later, Mattel Embraces ‘Barbie Girl,’ N.Y. TIMES MEDIA
DECODER (Aug. 26, 2009, 4:30 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/yearslater-mattel-embraces-barbie-girl/; Elva Ramirez, Barbie’s First Music Video Turns the Aqua
Original on Its Head, WALL ST. J. SPEAKEASY (Aug. 28, 2009, 12:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
speakeasy/2009/08/28/barbie-model-astronaut-rock-star-marxist-theorist/.
302. See KLEIN, supra note 127, at 365, 379, 387.
303. Id. at 366–79.
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Brand activism highlighted Shell’s operations in Nigeria and how
the company and some powerful government leaders made large sums
of money while those residing near the oil drilling sites lived in squalor,
faced environmental harms from the drilling process, and in some cases
were killed for protesting the exploitation.304 Other Shell brand activism
stopped the company from sinking a rusty old oil platform in the
Atlantic Ocean. By sharing information about the cost to a $128 billion
company of sinking the platform ($16 million) compared to disposing
of it on land ($70 million), activists managed to generate protests and
boycotts of Shell stations, which saw drops in business ranging between
“20 and 50 percent.”305
In the so-called McLibel case, two environmental activists made
claims about McDonald’s role in deforestation, developing countries’
poverty, animal cruelty practices, harming public health, poor labor
practices, and advertising that improperly targeted children.
McDonald’s initially responded with legal action but tried to settle once
the case started generating negative publicity. The defendants chose not
to settle, and the 313-day trial continually placed McDonald’s business
practices in the spotlight.306
These activities do not always lead to results that brand activists
appear to desire. In some specific cases, such as with Shell and the oil
platform, behaviors change. Nike’s stock dropped and some thought the
human rights and labor issues were part of that market trouble.307
McDonald’s and Shell faced continued scrutiny of their business
practices. Nonetheless, as Klein admits, in other cases problems persist:
Shell still operates in Nigeria with violence and other harms
surrounding the operations; Nike has not faced a total boycott and still
uses low-cost, international labor to make its products; and McDonald’s
won its case.308
The lesson is not that brand activists will always be able to alter
corporate behaviors in fundamental ways. Instead, corporations should
appreciate that the brand is an information vehicle that can signal
market conditions and interests. Brands are not just important, useful
information resources for the noncorporate side of brands, but for the
corporate side, as well.

304. Id. at 383–84.
305. Id. at 379–80.
306. Id. at 387–89.
307. Id. at 377–78.
308. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Steel & Morris, [1997] EWHC (QB) 366 (Eng.), available
at http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/verdict/verdict_jud.html; see also McDonald’s Corp. v.
Steel, [1995] 3 All E.R. 615 (Eng.); Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, [2005] ECHR
68416/01; accord KLEIN, supra note 127, at 376–77, 387, 390.
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Evolving conceptions of the market and how value is created
challenge core assumptions in trademark theory. Trademark theory and
doctrine ostensibly rely on a product focus and see all market action as
firm-driven and controlled. The firm pushes information to the
consumer and the market. In this view, “[Trademark] law’s core
mission, as it is understood today, is to facilitate the transmission of
accurate information to the market.”309
In contrast, economic theory that looks to the co-creation of value
posits that instead of a “[o]ne-way,” “[f]irm to consumer,” “[c]ontrolled
by [the] firm” “[c]onsumer [as] ‘prey’” perspective of markets, a
“[t]wo-way,” “[c]onsumer to firm,” “[c]onsumer to consumer,”
“[c]onsumer [who] can ‘hunt’” perspective is the reality of a co-creation
market.310 As Prahalad and Ramaswamy argue:
Unless we make a shift from a firm-centric to a co-creation
perspective on value creation, co-extraction of economic
value by informed, connected, empowered, and active
communities of consumers on the one hand and cost
pressures wrought by increased competition, competitive
discontinuities, and commoditization on the other will only
make it harder for companies to develop a sustainable
competitive advantage. The future belongs to those that can
successfully
co-create
unique
experiences
with
311
customers.
Under this view, “Co-creation converts the market into a forum where
dialogue among the consumer, the firm, consumer communities, and
networks of firms can take place.”312 In other words, decentralized, twoway information flow is a key part of co-creation of value.
A brand theory of trademark incorporates the way in which
consumers and communities interact with a brand and explicitly takes a
co-creation view of brands. In this view, brands are two-way, rather
than one-way, information conduits. This approach abandons the idea
that a brand or trademark is static. No matter what a company wishes to
be the meaning of a brand, consumers and communities will interact
309. Bone, supra note 8, at 548 (emphasis added).
310. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 12 tbl.2; cf. Michael Porter & Mark R.
Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social
Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78, 91 (arguing that managers must abandon
their “ingrained us-versus-them mind-set” so they can generate shared value as part of a
corporate social responsibility strategy).
311. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 12.
312. Id. at 11–12; cf. Porter & Kramer, supra note 310, at 91 (arguing that because
“exposure to criticism and liability, and consumers’ attention to social issues are all persistently
increasing” the opportunities to increase value based on social matters are increasing, as well).
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with and decide what the brand means to them.313 These interactions
can be either positive or negative. Trying to hem in the noncorporate
dimensions of brands is futile and in fact has the potential to harm the
brand, for those dimensions provide valuable information regarding the
brand.314
Put differently, brands are part of markets. Of great importance to a
theory addressing trademarks is the way in which brands have become
agents for social change and ways they affect market behaviors. In some
cases, noncorporate practices can provide useful information to
companies, as well as other consumers, about the brand and its related
product and company. In other cases, noncorporate practices can help a
company understand whether its view of the brand’s meaning fits its
audience’s perception.
A strategy that either responds to and incorporates consumers’ and
communities’ views or that engages in social responsibility could be a
way to co-opt critics, a sham, or a public relations move. That
perspective, however, misses the competitive strategy point:
The mutual dependence of corporations and society implies
that both business decisions and social policies must follow
the principle of shared value. That is, choices must benefit
both sides. If either a business or a society pursues policies
that benefit its interests at the expense of the other, it will
find itself on a dangerous path. A temporary gain to one
will undermine the long-term prosperity of both.315
A brand’s viability also operates under this type of mutual dependence.
A healthy, open view of brands with attentive and engaged consumers
and communities can contribute to a company’s value. Furthermore, as
the Harley-Davidson and other examples show, it is precisely this
symbiotic relationship that mitigates the ability of a company to take on
unauthentic postures; false or thin commitments to a cause or attempts
to jump on the latest trend are quickly identified and denounced.
In short, a brand theory of trademark rejects purely centralized
control as a losing strategy and shows that companies are more likely to
enhance brand value by paying attention to both positive and negative
313. See generally Beebe, supra note 31, at 812; Desai & Rierson, supra note 134, at 1789
(discussing the dynamic nature of language and the flaws in trying to control a trademark’s
meaning).
314. For example, brands can provide information that helps companies plan which
strategy to pursue. Cf. Porter & Kramer, supra note 310, at 91–92 (arguing that companies must
“identify the particular set of societal problems that it is best equipped to help resolve and from
which it can gain the greatest competitive benefit”).
315. Porter & Kramer, supra note 310, at 84.
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consumer and community interactions with a brand rather than trying to
snuff them out.316 Furthermore, a brand theory of trademarks indicates
that the core mission of trademarks can and ought to be understood as
facilitating the transmission of accurate information within and across
the market, not simply from one side of the market to the other.
CONCLUSION: A POTENTIAL NEW ORDER FOR TRADEMARK LAW
Trademark law struggles to remain coherent. It simply is not sure
how to manage all the interests at stake in the modern business
environment. This failure flows from a core misunderstanding:
trademark law has not grasped that legal disputes over trademarks are in
fact disputes over brands.
This Article lays the foundation for future work on brands in the
law. It is not designed to rewrite all of trademark law. Instead, by
synthesizing brand scholarship, this Article offers a brand theory of
trademarks. This theory provides clear foundational insights and a
normative lodestar for future trademark policy and scholarship.
Law and economics has laid claim as an overarching and coherent
way to understand trademark law. That claim must be limited to a
narrow conception of what trademarks, as a subset of brands, do.
Furthermore, under the law and economics search cost theory of
trademark law, trademarks play a vital role in providing information to
the marketplace. Yet, as this Article has shown, trademark law vaunts
corporate and producer interests in pushing information to consumers
while undermining the ability for others to participate in the information
marketplace.
A brand theoretical approach to trademarks presents a better, more
functional understanding of what trademark law protects. This approach
clarifies how trademark law has expanded over the years so that
doctrines such as anonymous source, confusion, trade dress, family or
house marks, merchandising rights, assignment in gross, initial interest
and post-sale confusion, and dilution vindicate business interests in
controlling brands while shirking the responsibility to manage the full
range of consumer and community interests.
As a diagnostic matter, a brand theory of trademarks allows for clear
identification of what interests are at stake. Each dimension of a
brand—product, corporate, consumer, and community—is important to
a well-functioning brand. By parsing corporate and noncorporate
dimensions of a brand, courts and policymakers can identify what rules
and metrics ought to apply. In some cases, economic and competition
rules will be best suited to a problem. Even so, understanding brands
316. See supra Part I.C.
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helps assess the nature of competition and pricing in such contexts.317 In
other cases, individual and community interests may be the concern. In
those situations, a brand perspective offers a fuller way to understand
what those interests are and whether they are harmful to a corporate
mark holder.318 A brand theory of trademarks permits one to see the true
interests at stake in a claim and then decide whether to expand or limit
trademark law’s reach.
Moreover, a brand theory of trademark shows that if trademark law
is to continue to rely on information transmission as its normative
foundation, trademark law must acknowledge and incorporate the fact
that in today’s information-driven economy, brands are two-way
information channels. Modern business theory sees that value as a cocreative process. In many areas, the corporation provides resources to
consumers and communities who then interact with the resources to
create something new.319 The open source movement is but one
example of the insight that “[t]he interaction between the firm and the
consumer is becoming the locus of value creation and value
extraction.”320
In short, the brand understanding of trademarks offered in this
Article identifies the true nature of a brand: a dynamic information
device subject to interpretation and reworking by all connected to it. As
information plays an ever-larger role in our economy, a brand theory of
trademarks offers the opportunity to bring trademark law into the
information age. Rather than relying on a limited view of trademarks
where corporations expend vast resources as they try to control the
meaning of a mark, corporations would focus on developing and
protecting brands in competitive contexts while also using the brand to
help develop future strategies based on market information provided by
consumers and communities. In addition, this approach would open the
door to trademark living up to a vision where all sides of the market
have “an informational context that is appropriately robust”321 for their
decisions and can truly signal market preferences.

317. See generally Desai & Waller, supra note 23.
318. Cf. McKenna, supra note 53, at 117 (discussing possible brand-informed views of
harm within trademark law).
319. See supra notes 311–12 and accompanying text.
320. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 5.
321. See Kysar, supra note 288, at 535.
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